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Can the Rentier System in Jordan be Reformed? 
Katherine Tsantes, Political Science and Islamic Civilization and Societies (Class 
of 2013) 
Research Advisor: Professor Kathleen Bailey 
The recent wave of unrest across the Middle East has raised crucial questions 
about the stability of the remaining regimes in the region. Monarchies have 
appeared to have weathered the Arab Spring well and have emerged relatively 
intact while republics such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria have experienced 
revolutions that have completely overturned existing political and economic 
systems. Jordan has consistently been praised as a beacon of gradual liberalization 
in a region where so many dictators have ruthlessly clung to power. Upon closer 
inspection, however, the Jordanian system is not as well adjusted to democracy 
and economic capitalism as it may seem. The rentier system, most commonly 
found in resource rich countries, allows authoritarian regimes to co-opt their 
populations by using economic rent to supply goods and services usually provided 
by representative governments. Jordan fulfills a unique role as a rentier state 
because it does not possess natural resources but is instead able to co-opt its 
citizens as a result of the influx of external rent that the government receives 
through foreign aid and remittances. Drawing analysis primarily from scholarly 
articles and making use of media analysis and first person interviews, I examine 
the current problems facing the Jordanian system and the changes that have taken 
place as a result of the popular uprisings during the Arab Spring. The larger 
implications of this research present a roadmap for other entrenched regimes to 
follow in order to avoid falling into the self reinforcing and destructive system of 
favors and economic rent. While it may be too late for Jordan to reform its 
political system without a revolutionary overhaul, other regimes have the 
potential to work their way out of the rentier system before the network of rent-
seeking groups in itself becomes a force that not even the regime can stop.      
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Introduction: Reforming a Rentier State during the Arab Spring 
 While it may appear simple to grasp the concept of a state that gains support from 
its people through co-optive measures, what must occur for a state with no natural 
resources to speak of to obtain the funds necessary for a widespread bribery of its people? 
Any visitor to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is immediately presented with outward 
signs of popular support of the royal family, and King Abdullah II in particular. Pictures 
of the Hashemite family line the streets and pictures of King Abdullah II and his father 
King Hussein can be found in most cabs. Upon venturing to a supermarket or shopping 
center, an outsider is immediately confronted with the fact that both bread and gasoline 
products are extremely inexpensive for a country that lacks both oil reserves and a strong, 
organized agricultural community. While Jordan has still felt the calls for reform that 
have swept through the Middle East in the last two years, it has not experienced the same 
unrest and violence that have prevailed in authoritarian regimes in the region. How has 
Jordan managed to survive as a rentier state without any natural resources? Can the 
Jordanian regime remain in power in the coming years even as the rest of the region falls 
into chaos and revolution? 
 These questions regarding the rentier state are especially relevant in today’s 
political climate in the Middle East. The revolutions that have swept through the region 
have toppled long standing authoritarian regimes in a matter of weeks and have brought 
hope to millions who live under oppressive governments. Jordan has continued to stand 
out amid the turmoil as a pillar of stability and as a result has been made an example of 
by the United States as a monarchy that is pursuing reform and listening to the demands 
of the people. While an initial glance at Jordanian society would agree with the statement 
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that Jordan is a stable monarchy with ample popular support for the king, upon further 
examination cracks in the system begin to appear. In a state where criticizing the king is 
illegal, all protests begin by praising the king and continuing on to criticize economic 
conditions and the government. Parliament has an astonishing rate of turnover and 
ministers are replaced with such frequency that the public has stopped paying attention to 
all of the changes. The rentier system reinforces itself and this is evident in the case of 
Jordan, where the powerful manipulate reforms to maintain their status at the expense of 
the broader population. This research is relevant to the current climate in the Middle East 
because many regimes are facing the same challenges that are being presented to the 
Jordanian regime. All rentier states need to prepare themselves for inevitable pushback 
against the system and can learn from any mistakes or successes that take place in Jordan. 
Exemplary resource rentier states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have been successful 
at co-opting their people up to this point in time but they will eventually reach the point 
at which their resources being to diminish and they too need to adapt to the demands of 
their populations. The research that will be presented can serve as a road map for regimes 
facing these problems and is especially relevant to the new developments in terms of 
Islamist power in the region.  
 Prior research on this topic has been mainly conducted up to this point in the form 
of research carried out in the spring of 2012 in Amman, Jordan. Two interviews were 
with leading Jordanian economists, one working within the private sector and one 
removed from the rentier system. Primary sources in the form of newspaper reports found 
while in Jordan were also used alongside scholarly articles to create the foundations of 
the research conducted regarding the rentier state as it exists in Jordan. In order to 
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maintain consistency with current events, the Jordan Times will be relied upon as a 
foundational and moderately neutral source of Jordanian and Middle Eastern affairs.  
 Foundational works by scholars such as Karl Polanyi, Juan Linz and Alfred 
Stepan will be relied upon in order to foster an understanding of the basics of 
democratizing and liberalizing conditions in any political system, as well as economic 
progress in general terms. Institutions such as Brookings, International Crisis Group and 
Carnegie will be relied upon in large measure due to the timeliness of their publications 
and relevance to the current issues. Authors and fellows of these institutions, such as 
Kenneth Pollack, Curtis Ryan, Glenn Robinson, and Salman Shaikh have written 
extensively on the issues of reform in the Middle East and specifically regarding the case 
of Jordan’s economy in today’s political climate.  
 As a result of the recent developments on the Jordanian political scene, current 
news articles from the Jordan Times, Al Jazeera, and the New York Times. The Atlantic 
magazine is also used as a reliable source based on its currency and relevance to political 
developments in Jordan over the past two years. Various journalists at these different 
news outlets will be quoted in order to prevent bias from different nations from impacting 
the integrity of this research. Specifically, Reuters journalist Suleiman al-Khalidi has 
worked with various nongovernmental organizations in Jordan and his articles have aided 
in contributing to the analysis of the fall 2012 protests in Jordan.  
 While this research finds its strengths in its relevance to current events and regime 
change in the Middle East, there are certain limitations to consider when reviewing any 
study of political and economic conditions of this kind. All reports and data that are 
coming out of the Middle East right now are significant because of their current 
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relevance, however their scope is currently lacking as a result of limited time and 
resources. Additionally, primary source news reports need to be evaluated in the context 
that they are produced under restrictive regimes wherever overt or inherent pressure may 
be placed on media outlets in order to portray the parties in power in a favorable light. 
Additionally, while much research has been conducted in the past on the conditions in 
rentier states that have natural resources, much less focus has been placed on states such 
as Jordan that exist on the basis of the external rent that they receive. The lack of detailed 
analysis on this subject only makes this research more important because it analyzes 
unusual conditions in the rentier system and applies older research to new developments.  
 The majority of this research relies upon content analysis, with emphasis on 
articles and papers from think tanks and other large research organizations. Some on-site 
interviews conducted in Jordan are used for background information on the Jordanian 
system, as well as perspective into the sentiments of the Jordanian public. In the same 
sense, newspaper articles and other media that have been utilized must be evaluated in 
the context of the current political situation that they have resulted from and not as pure 
and infallible fact. LexisNexis has become an invaluable resource in finding reliable 
English news sources. While English news sources are improving constantly, they are 
delayed in being published because they must first be translated into English and then 
distributed. Some nuances in facts and descriptions may be lost in the process of 
translation and add to the considerations that must be taken into account when reviewing 
this research.           
 This thesis will begin with a literature review that includes detailed sections on 
general rentier states and Jordan as a rentier nation. An initial overview of the literature 
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pertaining to the characteristics of a rent-seeking society is necessary before delving into 
the specific issues facing those nations that have built their legitimacy atop a system of 
distributing privilege and subsidies. The next section will discuss the model of a rentier 
state and nations that fall into this category. Saudi Arabia will be used as a case study in 
order to explore a state that relies upon natural resources, specifically oil, in order to gain 
the funds necessary to co-opt their populations. This will also include a description of the 
resource curse, which is another factor plaguing these nations in which reform is stifled 
in order to give the reeling regime more power as creativity drains from the population. 
The second section will delve into the conditions present in Jordan specifically as a 
rentier state that does not possess the vast quantity of natural resources that are present in 
many of the Gulf States. The external rent received by this regime allows it to fulfill the 
major aspects of the rentier system but the steps that Jordan must take in order to secure 
this rent include foreign and domestic policy that influences the amount of foreign aid it 
receives. Whether Jordan can be deemed a ‘quasi-rentier’ state or whether it is a fully 
fledged rentier system in its own right is an issue that is debated by many economic 
analysts, however the results of the system remain largely the same for its population 
regardless of this discrepancy. This chapter will conclude by reviewing the domestic and 
foreign implications of state policies that are designed in order to keep rent flowing 
towards the parties in power in the current political system. A brief chapter regarding the 
history of Jordan and its relations to Western powers has been included in order to 
enhance the understanding of the depth and complexity of such an economic and political 
system. Major historical events, such as world conflicts and significant milestones in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict have been included as they related to Jordanian politics.  
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 The next chapter will be focused on the issue of rising Islamist power across the 
Middle East. The rentier state has evolved as a way to distribute goods and services and 
Islamists have emerged as the only alternative path to receiving these services outside of 
the government. Islamist power in Jordan, Egypt and in the Gulf will be examined in 
order to assess the true implications of the Arab Spring on this issue. Specifically, the 
Muslim Brotherhood and its power and connections in Jordan will be used as the major 
group that presents opposition to the existing government system. The next chapter will 
examine the actions of the Arab Spring, across the region and in Jordan in particular, in 
terms of the political and economic changes that have taken place in the past two years. 
Jordan’s moderate political and economic reforms will be discussed, with emphasis on 
the much maligned electoral reform laws that have gone into effect. The question of 
whether significant change in Arab political systems has in fact taken place or whether 
the same groups remain politically entrenched despite reform and revolution will be 
explored. Specifically, the protests that spread through the streets of Amman during the 
fall of 2012 will be utilized as an example of the popular sentiment of the Arab Spring 
manifesting itself in mainstream Jordanian politics. The spring 2013 parliamentary 
elections will be discussed in order to determine if true and meaningful democratization 
measures were actually endorsed by the regime and if popular opinion had any real 
impact upon new policies and regulations. Finally, a concluding chapter will be devoted 
to analyzing potential plans for future democratization in the Middle East.  If the rentier 
state can be gradually reformed without a full scale revolution then the steps necessary to 
achieve these measures will be addressed. States such as Egypt that have experienced a 
full revolution as well as states such as Jordan that are working through gradual reforms 
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will be compared in order to enhance understanding of the ways in which change must 
occur when a system has been built entirely around rent seeking groups and parties in 
power.  
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A Nation-State out of the Desert: 
Jordanian History from the Great Arab Revolt to the rule of King Abdullah II 
 As it stands today, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has a population of about 
six million people, with about ninety percent of its citizens being Arabs and ninety-five 
percent being Muslim. There is a Christian minority that makes up five percent of the 
population but all citizens to maintain the freedom to practice their own religion. The 
government mandates compulsory, free education for children up to the age of sixteen 
and there are about 2.7 million students in the country. Jordanian exports consist of 
phosphate, cement, and potash and agriculture makes up less than ten percent of the 
national income. Its military is the Arab Army, which extends to the entire Arab world 
beyond Jordanian borders. His Majesty the King is the head of the government, chief 
executive and commander-in-chief, but there exists a legislative, judicial and executive 
branch that is headed by the Prime Minister. Through the years Jordan has existed as a 
historical crossing point between nations and its very creation has helped to contribute to 
the rentier system that currently dominates the political system.   
 The geographical area of TransJordan was a part of the Ottoman Empire until the 
end of World War I. During the First World War, British Middle Eastern foreign policy 
was designed to foster support against the Ottomans, as well as other Central Powers. 
This policy formation lacked a common direction and was regulated by three different 
offices: the ministry of foreign affairs, the Indian office and the Arab office. Despite the 
lack of common direction in British foreign policy, General McMahon was successful in 
gaining Arab support from Sharif Hussein against the Ottoman Empire. Although the 
McMahon-Hussein correspondence of 1915 was vague, it did accomplish the British goal 
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of inciting an Arab revolt against their Ottoman rulers. Sharif Hussein demanded that the 
British pledge money and political support in return for leading the Arab uprising. The 
British agreed to create independent Arab states in all areas except for the most contested 
areas of Palestine and Lebanon. McMahon’s promises were vague and Hussein 
interpreted them as more favorable to his aims than the terms that were agreed upon by 
both parties. Although the title of ‘king of all Arab countries’ was not promised to 
Hussein in reality, he expected to be given this title in exchange for leading the Great 
Arab Revolt
1
. Hussein then refused to accept the deal because the Palestinian territory 
was not given to him under his list of large territorial demands and feelings of distrust 
dominated relations between leaders of TransJordan and Great Britain from that point on.  
 In 1916 a secret agreement between Britain and France called the Sykes-Picot 
agreement came to light. This deal partitioned areas of Turkey and the Middle East to 
serve British and French interests before the war was even won. Both nations attempted 
to honor each other’s interests and avoid post-war conflict, but neglected to honor the 
wishes of any of the people already residing in these areas. Under this agreement France 
was given control of the areas which are now southern Turkey, Syria and Lebanon and 
Britain gained southern Iran, TransJordan, the west coast of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and 
eastern Yemen. These territories then became mandate states following the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire and the extent of colonialism that took place during this time paved 
the way for the existence of Jordan as an artificial transit state.     
 Following the Paris Peace Conference, the Sykes Picot agreement was put into 
action. TransJordan became a British mandate state where the official policy was that 
Britain would provide advice instead of control and that Jordan would receive its 
                                                 
1
 William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Oxford, UK: Westview Press, 2000), 157. 
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independence when it was deemed prepared. As a concession to Sharif Hussein, the 
British awarded his sons, Feisal and Abdullah the kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan, 
respectively. While the British did not see Abdullah as a competent ruler, they found it 
easier to simply give him control of the kingdom and the Emirate of TransJordan was 
recognized as an independent constitutional state in 1923.
2
 The borders of this new state 
were arbitrarily made without regard for the populations already living in the Levant and 
Britain continued to give Abdullah large amounts of annual aid in order to keep the 
kingdom stable.
3
 
 Since its inception, Jordan's monarchy has relied upon support from its tribal 
population as a cornerstone of regime security. Sharif Hussein ensured the stability of the 
fledgling nation by co-opting Bedouin tribesmen and turning them into a functioning 
military force. He was then able to secure the boundaries of the newly founded 
Transjordan and continue ruling over the population. In order to win the allegiance of 
these nomadic tribes, Sharif Hussein had to provide them with valuable goods and 
services. Native Jordanians have remained invaluable to the stability of the Hashemite 
family.  Over the years, the regime's liberalization efforts have centered on actions that 
can solidify support from core groups of both TransJordanians from the East Bank, as 
well as the local business community.
4
 Both of these groups provide the popular support 
that the regime needs in order to stay in power. Therefore, government actions are often 
based around providing additional benefits to these two demographic classes. 
                                                 
2 Milton-Edwards, Beverly, and Peter Hinchcliffe. Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy. 2nd ed. New York, 
NY:Routledge, 2001, 19.  
3
Ibid., 20-21. 
4
Scott Greenwood, "Jordan's 'New Bargain:' The Political Economy of Regime Security," The Middle East 
Journal 57, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 249.   
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 The regime's reliance on tribal support can be traced back to before the Hashemite 
family even gained control of TransJordan. In the film Lawrence of Arabia, Auda ibn 
Tayi states that the Turks give him money to subdue his tribe so that they will not attack 
passing caravans. In this system, the tribal leaders are given money to subdue their tribe 
and they keep some of the money for themselves while giving the rest to tribesmen.
5
 At 
first the Turks used this system to ensure the safety of caravans and the Hashemite family 
has continued the practice of giving benefits to tribal leaders to ensure their loyalty to the 
government. In order to preserve the stability of the government, tribal leaders needed to 
be given an incentive not to revolt. As the system has progressed, tribes have continued 
to provide necessary support for the Hashemite family and their loyalty is ensured by the 
benefits they reap from external rent.    
 Initially, bringing these tribal leaders into a new government system was crucial 
to the stability of Jordan. Historically, “the support lent by tribes to the ruling family 
must be seen as the result of a specific historical process of state-building during the 
formative years of the British mandate. It allowed for the integration of the tribes into the 
modern state and their acceptance of the political order.”6 Nomadic tribes made up the 
majority of their population and their acceptance of being ruled by a newly installed 
government enabled the monarchy to have power over its citizens. In the first years of 
King Abdullah I’s leadership, he “was careful to establish and maintain alliances with the 
strong nomadic tribes.”7 During these years the survival of fledgling TransJordan was 
                                                 
5
Yusuf Mansur, interview by author, Enconsult office, March 13, 2012.  
6
 Yoav Alon, The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism, and the Modern State (New York, NY: I.B. 
Tauris, 2007), 1. 
7
 Ibid., 41. 
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“dependent on the strong tribes who held physical control over the country.”8 Jordan 
could not have survived as a state if it were not for the acquiescence of the tribes. 
 As a Middle Eastern nation formed during the European colonial era, “Jordan’s 
origins lie in this improbable combination of foreign and colonial regime together with 
indigenous Arab tribal society… [and] Jordan is commonly perceived as an artificial 
colonial creation.”9 The lack of a cohesive identity among the nomadic tribes in this area 
of desert has led to the idea that Jordan does not have a historical or geographic reason to 
exist as a state. Britain’s heavy hand in dividing up the Middle East into nation states left 
TransJordan in a weak political position because it did not possess significant sea ports, 
natural resources, or historically significant cities and instead gave the tribes critical 
power over this new state. Beginning in the 1920s, the reliance on tribal leaders as 
middlemen between the government and its people “blurred the boundaries between state 
and society.”10 These tribal elders were suddenly given political power as a result of the 
system they had arbitrarily been place in by Britain.  
 There were certainly positive and negative effects of European interference in 
Middle Eastern affairs. During the period of indirect British rule, “the chieftancy 
continued to operate alongside the central government. Moreover, the nomadic tribes 
benefited from the existence of weak, limited government and continued to enjoy 
complete autonomy in the desert until the end of the decade.”11 This system of 
governance gave power to tribal leaders instead of political officials and led to the East 
Bank tribes becoming a significant rent seeking group in current affairs as well. 
                                                 
8
 Ibid..  
9
 Ibid., 3. 
10
 Ibid., 71. 
11
 Ibid., 61-62. 
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However, it was in line with British security interests for the Jordanian infrastructure to 
be built up in order to maintain law and order. In 1925, networks of roads, trains, 
telegraph, and telephone lines were funded by the British government.
12
 Without this 
financial and logistical assistance, the Jordanian government would not have been able to 
develop as quickly. While the actions taken by Britain immediately following the 
formation of this nation-state stunted its political growth, they also aided in the creation 
of a modern state in an undeveloped area.     
 While Transjordan continued to be a British colonial possession, its fifteen years 
under the control of another country came to a close in the 1940s. As a result of Cold 
War tensions, the United States had determined that “Jordan [was] an important barrier to 
the spread of radical Arab influence and communist infiltration. Hence, the White House 
declared that the independence of Jordan was vital to the United States.”13 A few years 
after Jordan became an independent nation under King Abdullah I, in April of 1957, 
Washington gave Jordan a ten million dollar grant which “was an indication that the 
United States has indeed replaced Great Britain in Jordan.”14 As a part of the strategic 
alliances built up during this time in history, Jordan was pulled into the Cold War system 
as an ally of American. This vital support during the first decade of Jordan’s status as an 
independent state caused the United States to be a major player in shaping the boundaries 
of the Middle East.  
 The creation of Israel in 1948 engulfed the entire region in turmoil. Abdullah 
responded to the violence by proclaiming himself king of all Palestine and attempted to 
                                                 
12
 Ibid., 63. 
13 Miriam Joyce, Anglo-American Support for Jordan: The Career of King Hussein (New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 20. 
14
 Ibid. 
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gain popular support for his rule.
15
 The annexation of the West Bank by Jordan isolated 
King Abdullah from the rest of the Arab world, but gained him favor with the Western 
powers and Jordan was finally recognized as an independent nation by the United States 
in 1949.
16
 Unfortunately, Abdullah’s imperial aspirations across the Middle East did not 
bode well for relations with other Arab nations and he was assassinated at the Al-Aqsa 
Mosque in Jerusalem in 1951. The kingdom remained in a state of turmoil, with both 
internal threats resulting from succession to the throne and external threats from the 
Arab-Israeli conflict to their stability following Abdullah’s death. 
 King Talal assumed power following a brief power struggle between himself and 
a half-brother of the late King Abdullah. Loyalties shifted constantly as a result of 
fighting both within the kingdom and across the Middle East. During this time the 
“benevolent despotism [of Jordan’s] political system illustrat[ed] just how far behind had 
been left the naiveté of its youth.”17 The most major accomplishment of King Talal’s 
reign was the 1946 reform of the constitution, which allowed for a separation from 
policies that were dominant during the period of heavy handed British influence. 
Additionally, the new constitution that was passed in 1952 emphasized the role that Islam 
played as the official state religion, as well as embraced a parliamentary system that 
adhered to the modern sense of a legislature.
18
 King Talal’s behavior during this year 
became increasingly erratic and his refusal to abdicate the throne resulted in his forced 
resignation due to provisions made in the constitution he himself created.
19
 Talal’s short 
                                                 
15
 Greenwood, “Jordan’s New Bargain,” 30. 
16
Ibid.  
17
 Robins, Philip. A History of Jordan. N.p.: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 79.  
18
 Milton-Edwards, Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy, 33-34.  
19
 Robins, A History of Jordan, 82.  
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rule did implement much needed reforms but the frequent transitions of power did not 
help the country develop its economy or political systems in any durable change.  
 King Hussein took the throne in 1953 and inherited a slew of socio-political 
problems, the most pressing of which was the refugee crisis that had erupted as a result of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Security in the kingdom was constantly threatened by power 
plays from other Middle Eastern nations seeking to increase their own territorial 
aspirations and as a result from “this point onwards real political power and authority in 
the country became the preserve of the few rather than the many.”20 A strong executive 
was necessary in order to maintain the fragile political system that had been created. 
During this period the power of the Diwan, or Royal Court, emerged as a way to 
represent the king’s policy directly to the tribal units that made up the cornerstone of 
support for the regime.
21
 In a system dominated by tribes, Hussein became the patriarchal 
leader of the entire country during his extensive reign. 
 Hussein’s rule was by no means a period of peace for the country and some of the 
most significant battles between the Israelis and the Palestinians took place while he was 
king. The large number of Palestinian refugees in Jordan caused public opinion to support 
action against the newly formed Zionist state. King Hussein agreed to join Syria and 
Egypt in attacking Israel in June 1967 although he knew a military defeat would be soon 
to follow. The Six-Day war was a disaster politically for Jordan because both the West 
Bank and East Jerusalem were captured by Israeli forces. Despite this loss of territory and 
defeat in terms of international diplomacy, Jordanians remained aligned with the 
Palestinian cause and the refugee situation has led to between forty and sixty percent of 
                                                 
20
 Milton-Edwards, Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy, 35.  
21
 Ibid., 36.  
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the population identifying themselves as Palestinians.
22
 Jordan continued to receive 
international aid for the presence of these refugees but their influence on the internal 
politics of Jordan was not always positive.  
 Following the Six-Day War, all Arab states joined together and made a statement 
against Israel, called the Khartoum Resolution. This meeting took place on 1 September 
1967 and stated ‘no’ to three concepts: no peace with Israel, no recognition of the Israeli 
state, and no to negotiations with Israel.
23
 While this meeting sent a message of Arab 
solidarity to the international community, Jordan had its own internal problems 
distracting King Hussein from pushing for a peace agreement. The Palestinian Liberation 
Organization, PLO, had been largely expelled from Israeli territory and their leaders 
moved into refugee camps on Jordanian soil to being organizing a resistance. They began 
launching attacks and raids from inside Jordanian territory and even set up military 
checkpoints throughout the country. These guerillas considered their organization to be 
so powerful in Jordan that they chose a strip of Jordanian desert to land three separate 
hijacked planes on 6 September 1970. King Hussein appeared to be powerless to stop the 
guerillas and in a subsequent speech he assured the fedayeen that he would not attempt to 
“destroy them under any circumstances.”24 Fedayeen groups posed a serious challenge to 
Jordanian stability during this period of time. King Hussein would have angered public 
sentiment by expelling the PLO but he risked retribution from Israel for allowing them to 
operate within his borders.   
                                                 
22
 Malik Mufti, "A King's Art: Dynastic Ambition and State Interest in Hussein's Jordan ,"  
Diplomacy and Statecraft 13, no. 3 (August 2002): 4, doi:10.1080/714000336.    
23
 Joyce, Anglo-American Support for Jordan, 34. 
24
 Ibid., 52-53.  
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 Between 1954 and 1969, the United States had given half of a billion dollars to 
the Jordanian government as aid. King Hussein pressed for still more support from the 
American government, damages from the Six-Day War and Israeli reprisals to fedayeen 
raids as evidence of Jordan’s needs. He threatened to turn to the Soviet Union for help if 
Jordan was not given more financial aid. In response, the United States agreed to help in 
modernizing Jordanian forces and gave about $100 million of military equipment to the 
military.
25
 Cold War tensions were utilized by Hussein shrewdly in order to gain more 
financial and military support for his kingdom. By continuing to play off of American 
fears of increasing Soviet influence in the Middle East, Hussein successfully increased 
Jordan’s political significance because his requests could not be ignored by American 
officials.  
 During the 1970s, when the PLO established its headquarters in Amman and 
accumulated more and more political power, it created a ‘state within a state’. Hussein’s 
power as monarch was challenged by paramilitary groups patrolling the streets of the 
capital and Israel threatening to attack Jordan because of its harboring of this group. King 
Hussein was eventually forced to take action during Black September in 1970 when he 
ordered military strikes to take place against the fedayeen network. This action directly 
confined the PLO to refugee camps in Jordan and indirectly increased Hussein’s own 
authoritarian rule while reinforcing the national identity.
26
 A more powerful executive 
was necessary in order to continue the existence of Jordan but it simultaneously limited 
political freedoms throughout the country.  
                                                 
25
Ibid., 36-7. 
26
Milton- Edwards, Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy, 42-43.  
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 In 1971 King Hussein went on an international tour, and in his meetings with 
leaders of the United Kingdom, Syria, and Egypt he determined that “Jordan was 
prepared to accept a unified Arab army on its soil, but only under Jordanian command.”27 
During a visit to Tel Aviv on 25 September 1973, King Hussein warned Israeli 
intelligence, the Mossad, of an impending attack from Egypt and Syria. While Israel did 
not take this threat seriously, troops from both Arab nations went to war with Israel on 6 
October. Jordan allowed Arab militaries to cross over its soil, but did not commit men 
directly to the fighting.
28
 The conflict was ended by UN Resolution 338, which was 
passed on 22 October. It dictated that all involved nations must stop military action and 
that Resolution 242 must be implemented, although it did not bring true peace because 
Israel continued to occupy Arab territory.
29
 Jordan did not lose any more land during this 
conflict, however it did not regain any of the areas lost to Israeli occupation and therefore 
King Hussein was hesitant to accept the Rabat Declaration of 1974, which gave the PLO 
the status of the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. After being promised 
an annual subsidy of $300 million from the Gulf States, King Hussein agreed to accept 
this declaration.
30
  
 The renewed violence between Arabs and Israelis in 1973 was largely considered 
a victory for Arab interests. Arab forces were financed by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and 
appeared to be winning for about three weeks until Israel pushed back, using an 
enormous amount of American foreign aid. The Israeli economy was badly damaged by 
this war, which the Arabs regarded as a victory. Following the conflict, Egyptian 
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President Anwar Sadat signed a surprise agreement with Israeli Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin at the Camp David Accords of 1978, which was later followed by a 
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Jordan then followed suit in 1994 as a concession 
to receive continued international aid and trade benefits during a time of economic crisis 
in the country.  
During the 1980s, King Hussein made a major foreign policy move that consisted 
of creating the Arab Cooperation Council. This move followed the end of the Iran-Iraq 
War and was meant to facilitate capital and labor flows between Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and 
Yemen.
31
 This agreement was intended to accelerate the money coming into Jordan, both 
from remittances and direct aid. While this agreement fell apart after the First Gulf War, 
its creation shows the importance of securing these sources of external rent. In order for 
the regime to survive, it needs to constantly be receiving external rent, which it can then 
use to further co-opt the population.  
 Jordan has traditionally relied on Iraq as a source of cheap oil. This economic 
relationship became controversial when Saddam Hussein lost favor with the international 
community. Tensions between Saddam and the West came to a head in 1990 during the 
First Gulf War, when a U.S.-led international coalition attacked in order to push Iraqi 
troops out of Kuwait. Jordan was hesitant in supporting the coalition, and King Hussein’s 
lack of action resulted in a severe cut to the aid Jordan received from the West. Following 
this foreign policy misstep, “Jordanian government officials remain[ed] wary of future 
such diplomatic- and more importantly economic- rifts with external benefactors.” 32 
Without the external rent in the form of foreign aid, the rentier system could not continue 
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to support the political elites. After the First Gulf War, Jordan’s leaders were careful not 
to oppose actions of the West for fear of losing these funds. 
 Immediately following Jordan’s fall from grace in the eyes of the international 
community, King Hussein revived the standing of his country by putting his efforts into 
alleviating the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1994, Jordan signed an independent peace treaty 
with Israel and was quickly rewarded by an influx of aid into the country. This was 
beneficial to the regime because “the intromission of such international support lowered 
the cost of domestic repression and fulfilled key political needs.”33 Peace with Israel 
meant that the United States “and its allies delivered mounting flows of economic aid and 
security assistance to Amman.”34 Jordan could now rely on a substantial flow of aid from 
the West because it had made peace with Israel. In return, the regime could utilize this 
money to continue its policies of cooption with the people and maintain their monopoly 
on power.  
When King Abdullah ascended to the throne, he continued his father’s policies of 
foreign actions based upon securing external rent. Jordan continued to support the United 
States following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. As a reward for supporting 
the West against terrorism, the U.S. doubled its aid package to Jordan and both countries 
signed a free trade agreement.
35
 The king himself travelled to Washington to meet with 
President Bush in order to secure the free trade agreement between these two nations. 
Exports from Jordan to the U.S. rose from 18 million in 1998 to one billion by 2009, 
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greatly raising the revenue flowing into Jordan.
36
 These additional funds allowed the 
regime to continue to subvert public opinion by providing goods and services desired by 
the population. During this time period the government expenditures increased while the 
“rift between state and society was…steadily growing.”37 The Jordanian people remained 
marginally disenfranchised by the rentier system receiving substantial amounts of 
external rent in reward for its pro-West policies. 
 King Abdullah did not stop at placating Western powers to obtain external rent. 
He began by focusing on Jordan’s relations with the oil-wealthy Iraq. Although Iraq still 
had an embargo on its goods according to the United Nations, Jordan broke this embargo 
and sent medical supplies and “high-level government delegations to Baghdad.”38 This 
move enabled Jordan to get back in Saddam’s good graces and therefore continue to 
secure cheap oil from a nearby source. As a resource poor nation, Jordan is forced to rely 
on these external rents in order to maintain the rentier system. By reaching out to Iraq, 
King Abdullah was once again able to utilize foreign policy to maintain the stability of 
the Jordanian system.  
 Having learned its lesson from the First Gulf War, Jordan did not dare to oppose 
the actions of America during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. While King Hussein had chosen 
to stay out of the international coalition in 1990, King Abdullah made Jordan “a logistical 
linchpin for the Iraqi invasion, providing over-flight to American combat jets and hosting 
thousands of Western military personnel.”39 Although public sentiment sided with Iraq 
during this period of time, the Jordanian government chose to repress the will of the 
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people once again and support the cause that would bring them the most foreign revenue. 
Jordan was then further rewarded by a one billion dollar grant in 2003 to compensate for 
the costs incurred during the Iraqi invasion.
40
 As a result of his foreign policy decisions, 
King Abdullah was able to further strengthen the power of the regime.       
 Jordan’s foreign policy today is dependent on issues mainly regarding the war on 
terrorism and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Jordanian regime must be careful to aid its 
financial allies in hunting down terrorist cells. Specifically, the international community 
applauded Jordanian intelligence for arresting eleven alleged Al-Qaeda operatives in 
October of 2012 who were plotting to attack commercial targets in Amman and Western 
diplomats on an international scale.
41
 The regime has retained its Western favor by 
continuing to cooperate in tracking down terrorists. Additionally, Jordan must remain 
conscious of its relations in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 1967 borders have been a point 
of contention throughout the sporadic negotiations that have taken place between 
Palestinians and Israelis. While conflict resolution hinges on more than simple land 
concessions, border issues have continued to directly impact Jordan. Currently, “King 
Abdullah is known as an advocate of two states for two peoples—Israel secure in its pre-
1967 borders, Palestine to be established in Gaza and the West Bank.”42 The large 
amount of Palestinians in Jordan has made the conflict a hugely significant factor in any 
of King Abdullah’s policy decisions.    
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Politics and Relations of Rentier States  
 Prevailing research on rentier states has focused on resource rich states, such as 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, along with other Gulf monarchies that have the ability to spend 
oil revenues on providing goods and services to their populations instead of offering 
democratic incentives to maintain power. This foundational theory is then applied to the 
case of Jordan, while taking into account that the Hashemite Kingdom’s rent comes from 
external sources and not natural resources. Jordan can be compared and contrasted 
against these oil-rich nations because it has still been able to stave off major calls for 
liberalization that have occurred during the Arab Spring. The mainstream viewpoint on 
this theory is that rentier states have extra funds on hand from the rent they receive and 
therefore have been able to continue co-opting their populations and avoid the backlash 
from the Arab Spring. 
 In Brenda Shaffer’s Energy Politics, the author explores the realm of high energy-
export regimes. The author describes the general tendency of energy exporters to have a 
distinctive pattern of economic and political development. These nations tend to have the 
highest foreign debt, lowest rate of democratic governance and the lowest levels of 
human development. Additionally, policy techniques that are usually utilized to promote 
democratic governance are not applicable to these types of regimes.
43
 Her overarching 
study of energy exporters supports the argument that these types of regimes inherently 
fall into a category of states that do not offer political or economic liberalization to their 
citizens.  
 A rentier state is defined by the basic economic relationship that exists between a 
government and its citizens. While typically a state must raise its own revenue and 
                                                 
43
Brenda Shaffer, Energy Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 5. 
24 
 
maintains accountability to its people through its institutions, a rentier state is able to 
supersede this accountability by directly co-opting its citizens. Instead of imposing taxes 
to fund its activities, a rentier state receives "rent [that] is external to the economy.”44 The 
rentier state is therefore able to provide its citizens with additional benefits that it would 
not be able to fund without this external source of revenue.       
 Receiving external rents allows a government to avoid taxation and therefore 
escape from some measure of accountability. Without a true system of taxation, the 
government becomes "autocratic and independent to [the social] classes.”45 Instead of 
remaining accountable through the system of taxation in exchange for representation, the 
rentier state is able to hold more control over its citizens because it is the sole distributor 
of rent. Citizens cannot use institutions to hold the government accountable because they 
must work within the rentier system that has been created. In this way, the government is 
able to use external rents to create "political loyalty in citizens and make a valid promise 
[that is not necessarily] economically effective.”46 As opposed to a system in which 
accountability and representation prevail, a rentier state is able to keep its citizens loyal 
by having low or non-existent taxes. In the absence of taxes, citizens are not able to 
effectively petition for changes in government because the government is the only system 
that is able to provide them with necessary goods and services. 
 Another consequence that results from the lack of taxation in the rentier system is 
the detrimental effect on development of the state itself. The rentier state "by liberating 
itself from the necessity of tax collection…unwittingly diminishes its own administrative 
                                                 
26
 Douglas A. Yates, "The Theory of the Rentier State," in The Rentier State in Africa: Oil Rent 
Dependency and Neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1996), 13. 
27
 Mojtaba Maghsoudi and Majid Khorshidi, "Solutions out of the Crisis of Democracy in the Middle East," 
Canadian Social Science 7, no. 1 (2011): 19. 
46
Ibid. 
25 
 
capacity.”47 Although the government is still receiving revenue from external sources, it 
is using these funds to provide direct compensation to the people instead of building the 
necessary institutions to help the growth of state infrastructure in the long run. The 
political influence that the distribution of rent gives to the government takes away any 
incentive for the government to foster institutions that would help citizens obtain goods 
and services on their own.
48
 The presence of external rents allows the government to 
obtain and maintain autocratic control over its citizens. However, this amount of control 
is often harmful to the very existence of the state system because political and social 
institutions are not created and therefore the state must continue to provide for its people. 
People remain loyal to the state not as a result of its political institutions but because of 
the inherent dependence of the population on the government in the rentier system.     
        As a result of the external rent received by the state, development is discouraged. It 
can be argued that "the welfare and prosperity imported from abroad 'pre-empts some of 
the urgency for change and rapid growth' and may in fact coincide with 'socio-political 
stagnation and inertia."'
49
 Government distribution of external rents takes away from 
movements for social and economic change because citizens are able to receive goods 
and services from the government although they do not possess a true justification for 
their political power. A government that needs to tax its people in order to obtain revenue 
for projects and services is more accountable than one that can simply rely on external 
rents. Social participation is discouraged in the rentier system because the state is 
providing goods and services for loyal citizens without the presence of political parties. 
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     The rentier system is also inherently harmful to the work ethic of the population as a 
whole. Governments receiving external rents retain the exclusive power to award 
valuable government contracts and jobs. These positions are given "as an expression of 
gratitude rather than as a reflection of economic rationale.”50  Loyalty to the regime is 
cultivated because wealth is earned not as a result of personal exertion but because of 
personal connections and pure chance.
51
 Active participation is not encouraged within the 
rentier system because work ethic is not rewarded and the rentier provides citizens with 
the goods and services they desire.  
 Shaffer breaks down the attributes of an oil exporting state even further and states 
that three factors make up the rentier system. The first is the income from natural 
resources is the most important input into the nation’s economy.52 If other goods are 
necessary exports that keep the country’s economy afloat then the diversification of the 
system will prevent the political and economic conditions necessary to the rentier system. 
Secondly, the majority of the revenue received by the state must come from abroad.
53
 
Domestic production of revenue would allow decentralization of power from the hands of 
the elite to the hands of the population, which would give the people a larger say in 
demanding liberalization measures. This second factor also applies to nations that do not 
export natural resources but instead rely on other foreign sources of revenue to perpetuate 
their own rentier nature. Finally, Shaffer points to the factor of a small portion of the 
population being engaged in generating the revenues and/or rents of the nation.
54
 If this 
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condition is met then power can be centralized in the hands of the few, who can then 
exclude the majority of the population from participating in democratic manner.  
 Beyond these three basic factors that make up Shaffer’s depiction of a rentier 
state, Shaffer agrees with the argument of Yates in stating that the state acting as a 
distributor is an essential feature of rentierism. These regimes take on the role of 
distributor of rents “instead of extracting revenue from the population through taxation, 
and thus [avoid] having to earn legitimacy from the public.”55 While states that do not 
receive the majority of their revenue from export sales must rely on the population to 
give them legitimacy, rentier regimes have the ability to use their revenue to remove 
themselves from the ebbs and flows of public opinion. This distribution power denies any 
demands for liberalization measures that the public might call for, because they are 
economically provided for by the state.  
 Michael Ross organizes his argument on oil-wealthy states in a slightly different 
manner than Yates and Shaffer. He takes both a qualitative and quantitative approach and 
examines the basic definitions of the rentier state before delving into an analysis of three 
casual mechanisms that contribute to the lack of democracy in oil producing states. Ross 
attributes the original definition of the rentier state to Hussein Mahdavy, who stated that a 
rentier state was one that received “substantial rents from ‘foreign individuals, concerns 
or governments.”’56 This primary definition provided the basis for classifying states that 
had access to large amounts of revenue coming into their country from external sources. 
Ross then acknowledges Hazem Beblawi as the scholar who refined this definition and 
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stated that rents must come from foreign actors, accrue directly to the state, and only a 
small number of elites may be involved in the generation of rent.
57
 Both of these 
definitions feed directly into the argument made by Shaffer and do not contradict any of 
the rentier theory that has been perpetuated thus far.  
 Ross then breaks from other scholars in the field to organize three causal 
mechanisms that he believes to be the most important contributions to the association 
between oil exports and the lack of democracy. The first of these mechanisms is the 
rentier effect itself. Under this effect there are many attributes that cause a resource rich 
nation to be able to fulfill the functions necessary for the denial of liberalization. Ross 
defines the taxation effect as a phenomenon in which governments that receive income 
from oil are less likely to tax their population and therefore the population will demand 
little or no accountability.
58
 Ross even pulls from Laurie Brand’s research on the topic to 
support this statement because it shows that during the 1980s when Jordan received less 
foreign aid, it was forced to decrease subsidies and calls for greater representation spread 
throughout the country.
59
 The taxation idea continues to support the previous theories, but 
organizationally Ross’s comments differ from other scholars in the field.  
 While still considering the rentierism mechanism, another aspect of this theory is 
the spending effect. Oil wealth leads to greater spending on patronage within a nation and 
therefore reduces pressure for democratization.
60
 While all authoritarian regimes utilize 
funds towards increasing patronage, states with oil exports have a much larger volume of 
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revenue entering their country and being funneled directly into the hands of the elite. This 
idea feeds into the last aspect of the rentier mechanism, which is the group formation 
effect. When a government has sufficient funds, it can prevent the formation of 
independent social groups that would be most likely to call for political reform.
61
 
Whether states under the rentier mechanism actively prevent the formation of 
independent civil society groups of whether oil wealth naturally discourages social 
groups from forming is a point that Ross acknowledges dispute upon but does not choose 
a side.
62
 Within the rentier mechanism, taxation, spending, and group formation are the 
three most important actions that Ross identifies as contribution to the notable lack of 
democratic movement. While other rentier scholars would not disagree with these 
statements, Ross organized his theory in a clear way that showed the direct correlation 
between the large volume of revenue flowing into a resource rich nation and the 
ineffectiveness and infrequency of calls for democracy.     
 The repression effect cannot be ignored when dealing with rentier states and their 
economies. Resource wealth allows rentier states to increase their military and security 
forces to ensure that any opposition to the government does not challenge the stability of 
the state.
63
 This phenomenon occurs specifically in the Middle East, where 
“democratization has been inhibited in part by the prevalence of the mukhabarat (national 
security) state.”64 A constant secret police presence hinders any type of democratic group 
formation because any groups or fledgling political parties that may oppose the 
government are closely monitored by the state. Freedom of expression is damaged in 
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these cases because citizens cannot speak out without fear of retribution from the 
government.  
 
Variation in Defense Spending, MENA countries as a Percent of GDP 
Adeel Malik and Bassem Awadallah, "The Economics of the Arab Spring,"World Development, 2013, 7. 
 Events of the Arab Spring have raised the issue of economics to the forefront of 
any political discussion in the Middle East. Many of the protests began as a result of the 
“stagnation of the Arab economies” in the region that snowballed into a larger chain of 
events leading to reforms and, in some cases, regime change.
65
 Rentier states have always 
utilized their wealth to subdue the population, but with the economic downturn of 2008 
many states suffered considerable loses to their rent. Economic significance plays into the 
argument that prosperity will satisfy the demands of the people and “undermine their 
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demands for political reform.”66 Rentier states utilize their resources in order to co-opt 
their populations and recessions often strain their very lifelines. The vast networks of 
repression, concessions and loyalty that support these states cannot function without 
constant financial input. 
 A wave of democracy swept through the Middle East in the wake of the Arab 
Spring protests, but many states could not sustain the path towards representative 
government. Stephen Grand argues that democracy requires a long term engagement 
from its citizens in order to be fully successful.
67
 Many states have embarked on a 
democratic path as a result of a popular movement in favor of more representation only to 
fall victim to civil war, cooptation by insiders, a new authoritative system, or have 
become a hybrid regime.
68
 If Jordan were to enact reforms leading towards democracy or 
be more severely impacted by a revolution, the new leaders would have to exercise 
vigilance in order not to fall into these common traps listed by Stephen Grand. The issues 
that Grand raises have been observed in other nations that have pursued liberalization 
measures only to become a state with a system with more repression and corruption than 
before.  
 All of the Brookings contributors offer different advice for fledgling democracies, 
and all of them agreed on the significance of civil society. Grand advocates the United 
States focusing foreign aid in these nations on education and civic organizations in order 
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to encourage bottom up reforms that will be sustainable in the long term.
69
 In a chapter 
written with Shadi Hamid and other Brookings contributors, Grand again refers to civil 
society as being able to generate “the impetus to reform beyond the initial transition 
period.”70 If citizens stop supporting democratization measures then there is no hope left 
for officials to follow through on promises of reform. Popular support is the most 
important sponsor of liberalization and its absence means that the incentive to make even 
gradual changes will slowly fall away.  
 Beyond simply achieving an atmosphere that fosters civil society, new 
democracies should be concerned with the respect for rule of law. Any politician can 
make sweeping reforms that will not be followed by citizens if respect for the law and 
enforcement measures are not present. Brookings contributors once again emphasize a 
“democratic political culture” in which the rule of law is respected and all disputes are 
“handled by a defined and transparent legal system overseen by an independent judiciary 
able to render judgment and have those judgments respected and implemented by all 
parties.”71 While this description is detailed and all of these institutions cannot appear 
overnight in developing democracies, this checklist would enable countries in transition 
to ensure that they are making progress in the right direction. Bottom up reform would 
make steps toward attaining and maintaining a stable rule of law system more credible 
and secure. Both popular support and the rule of law make up the foundations of a 
democracy in which repression and corruption have no place. Only after these initial 
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steps have been taken can states transition to a fully liberal system that endorses 
elections, reform and accountability.    
General Theory of a Rentier State 
 The Middle East is home to some of the most resource rich nations on the planet. 
In addition to holding most of the Earth’s oil reserves, these states also exhibit 
characteristics of extreme authoritarianism. While typically a state with more resources 
would utilize the flow of its revenue for economic development and eventual political 
liberalization, Middle Eastern states that possess these great reserves of oil and natural 
gas have pursued a path of dictatorship and oppression of their citizens. Typically, states 
that are able to sustain such a system utilize the rent that they receive from resource to 
co-opt their populations and discourage citizens from seeking any form of democracy. 
Leaders of these states have created numerous internal and external problems for 
themselves because they are forced to work within the rentier system. While these states 
are inherently undemocratic because of their resource wealth, understanding how rentier 
states operate in the Gulf is crucial to the development of the Jordanian quasi-rentier 
system.  
 Rentier states in the Middle East are concentrated in the Gulf region, where many 
states are able to utilize their oil resources to generate a majority of their national 
incomes.  In general, “the expression ‘rentier state’ refers to a country that garners a 
substantial portion of its income from external resources such as oil and gas.”72 Using an 
example of an extreme rentier economy, in 2008, Saudi Arabia’s oil, gas and mineral 
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rents made up 89.3% of its government revenue and 60.7% of GDP.
73
 In the case of 
Saudi Arabia, such a significant portion of the nation’s income is generated from natural 
resources that its economy is wholly dependent upon the price of oil. When oil prices are 
stable, the state is able to use the revenues that it receives from oil and natural gas to 
provide goods and services to its population that discourage its citizens from seeking 
democratic alternatives in government. As long as the state is able to continue generating 
these types of revenue, it can distribute rent among groups that support the regime.  
 Rentier states survive on the principle of taxation and representation. The state 
does not need to tax its citizens and therefore these regimes can function without much 
accountability from the people. “In the ideal-type rentier state, the state has a large degree 
of autonomy from society by virtue of external revenue; it delivers ‘goods’ to the 
population, demanding little in return except acquiescence.”74 If any of these states were 
forced to extract more than minimal taxes from their people their regimes would 
therefore be held accountable by their own citizens demanding a say in government. 
Once the system collects money from its people it can no longer be immune to popular 
opinion. These rentier systems and Gulf States in particular, are able to placate their 
populations not only through providing goods and services but additionally through the 
lack of taxation.    
 As a result of the revenues that rentier states receive from external sources, their 
populations are less inclined to demand representation in government. While many 
capitalist and Western nations function on the basis that “the extraction of taxes and 
public sacrifice evoke responses from those taxed,” rentier states are able to avoid taxing 
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their citizens.
75
 In combination with provision of goods and services, the lack of taxation 
discourages those living under rentier systems from seeking reform in government. States 
with vast oil resources in the Gulf have found that “there is little need to develop 
mechanisms of fiscal accountability for their citizens since the latter have been ‘bought 
off’ by the absence of taxes and the provision of social services and state-subsidized 
commodities.”76 Lack of taxes along with the provision of inexpensive or free goods and 
services has led to a politically apathetic population in these nations and a lack of 
political development in general. These regimes can therefore rule as they wish as long as 
they continue placating the people with rent.    
 State subsidies are an integral part of the regime’s appeal to its citizens under the 
renter system. The average motor fuel retail price from 2002 through 2004 in the United 
States was two dollars and ten cents, whereas the retail price in Saudi Arabia was only 
sixty four cents.
77
 Saudi Arabia’s leaders were able to offer this extreme subsidy only as a 
result of strong global oil prices, but as a result the regime offered its people more of an 
incentive to remain politically apathetic. In the rentier states of the Gulf, “oil revenues 
have enabled a social contract to evolve wherein untaxed citizens receive substantial and 
costly government services, making the public far less concerned about what goes on 
inside government as long as it is the recipient of such benefits.”78 Specifically in the case 
of subsidies, rentier regimes are allowed to operate with autonomy because of their 
generous financial aid given to citizens. This system can continue to function as long as 
the state keeps funding basic goods and services that are readily available to the people.  
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Potential Flaws in the Rentier System  
 Despite the seemingly ideal conditions that exist for dictators under the rentier 
system, there are many potential problems that arise when a regime builds its legitimacy 
on the basis of its external rent. “Since the state is the main dispenser of economic favors, 
those unhappy with their share have an obvious and visible target for their 
discontentment.”79 In many cases groups that do not receive rent focus all of their efforts 
on trying to discredit the ruling party instead of addressing the underlying issues of 
underrepresentation. Furthermore, because these governments cannot cite popular 
approval to legitimize their rule, they are forced to rely on “moral and cultural grounds” 
that are easily manipulated.
80
 The insecure reasoning for their rule does not help dictators 
who have excluded substantial portions of their populations from receiving rent. These 
regimes must utilize secondary reasoning to support their rule and therefore cannot enjoy 
the same type of stability in their rule as popularly elected leaders because rentier rulers 
only have the advantage of their rent.  
 Beyond the inherent problems in the justification of the legitimacy of rentier 
leaders, this type of economic system is inefficient. Subsidized goods and the “sales 
[from them] serve to reduce the profit pool and in turn lower the ability to fund 
investment.”81 These states use all of their resource revenues to encompass their 
populations and the profit from subsidized goods is not substantial enough to support 
economic well being. In a nation dependent on the cycle of cooption “a socio-economic-
political system develops that rewards rent-seeking…more than productive activities.”82 
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Individual innovation is not valued in a society in which the government provides many 
basic goods and services for its citizens. The rentier state is by definition an inefficient 
system because much more is spent as an input to the system than is produced. 
 The problem of an unproductive economy constantly plagues the rentier system, 
whether in times of market surplus or downturn. When oil revenues decrease there is a 
tendency to avoid reform because experimentation may cause more economic loses. 
However, when revenues increase there is no sense of urgency for change in rentier 
economies.
83
 As a result of this self-reinforcing system, there is no incentive for citizens 
or institutions to foster change, in either politics or the economy. For the future, “without 
real economic development and significantly broader political participation 
accountability for poor efficiency, periods of relatively low oil prices are likely to 
generate painful political and economic stresses in the Gulf region.”84 Reform is 
desperately needed in order to form a more sustainable state; however the rentier systems 
that exist will not begin to change as long as their rulers can continue to hold onto the 
power they hold over their populations.   
Effects of the Rentier State on Domestic Affairs 
 The rentier system in general favors certain institutions that function within the 
state. There are two main centers of power in this type of Middle Eastern regime: the first 
is the military, which is “the central fount of official power and the primary institution 
that supplie[s] the leaders and top officials of the state.”85 Given its control over the 
means of violence belonging to the state, the support of the military is crucial to any 
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regime that wishes to suppress any dissidents. The second center of control lies in official 
power, which is “designed to balance the repression of the military with popular 
mobilsation and mass political inclusion.”86 Having two sources of power allows the 
regime to pit them against each other and mitigate the threat of a coup while still gaining 
support from both of these groups. These groups receive much of the regime’s rent and 
block potential reforms from happening. While it is advantageous for the regime to utilize 
these two centers of power to solidify their rule, these groups prevent change because 
they benefit from the status quo.  
 Military power is crucial to the survival of rentier states, but often the militaries of 
these nations are not allowed to function at their full capacity. GCC militaries are 
fragmented because “similar to some of the Arab republican regimes, ruling elites have 
historically built up rival security forces as an ‘army to watch the army’ to reduce the 
risks of a military takeover.”87 Rentier states have continued funding their militaries in 
this manner in order to solidify their power, but these nations do not wish for the armed 
forces to become more powerful than the state itself. Specifically in GCC states, “ruling 
elites have at important instances created parallel military institutions for the purpose of 
satisfying the ambitions of different members and factions of the ruling family.”88 These 
multiple institutions require more of the state’s resources and do not increase the military 
strength of the country. The inefficiency of rentier states can be seen clearly in the 
process of both building and breaking down military strength.  
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 While all rentier states exhibit tendencies to keep their militaries prevalent but 
weak, the Gulf States have specific characteristics that separate them from other systems. 
In the Gulf, “military budgets are huge, the security forces often fragmented and shot 
through with informal patronage, and senior ranks include many members of the ruling 
families.”89 Oil wealth allows these actions to continue because it allows the regime to 
spend huge sums of money on the military without cutting back subsidies or other 
welfare programs. While spending this money could improve the power of the military to 
a degree where it would rival that of the state, Gulf governments have ensured that their 
“armies have been kept deliberately weak and unprofessional.”90 This practice would be 
unsustainable for states that need to derive their power from their population; however 
rentier economies are supported by the flow of external revenue that supports paying off 
a military system while still keeping it institutionally weak. 
 Middle Eastern nations have been found to have some of the weakest civil society 
systems in the world. The rentier state system could contribute to this pattern because 
civil society and political participation are not necessary for citizens to receive the goods 
and services that they desire. Despite the trend against civil society in rentier states, there 
is evidence that goes against popular logic in the region. Resource rich Kuwait has a 
strong civil society, referred to as the diwaniyya, which consists of regular gatherings of 
prominent men in homes to discuss social and public issues.
91
 Typically, a state with as 
much oil wealth as Kuwait would discourage civil society gatherings that might instigate 
calls for reform but the diwaniyya are not shut down by the state and continue to grow the 
fledgling civil society there. In contrast, Yemen does not receive much revenue from 
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sales of resources and is considered very primitive but has a very viable civil society.
92
 
The cases of Yemen and Kuwait detract from the argument that rentier states cannot 
support civil society organizations, although many Middle Eastern and rentier nations do 
not have any form of grassroots organizations that can be relied upon to discuss 
meaningful reforms.  
 Above all else, rentier states have shown a tendency to build up bureaucracies that 
they must then support and fund with their external rent. Recently, many regimes in the 
Middle East have brought forth extensive modernization campaigns and therefore big 
bureaucracies have been needed to execute the government’s plans.93 These bureaucratic 
systems are built up and filled with state employees who then become some of the 
biggest consumers of national rent. Typically, the institutions of the rentier state enable a 
bureaucracy in which “most of it [is] employed in the civil service, [and] also heavily 
dependent on the state and its pursuit of rentier economic policies.”94 The presence of 
such a system also detracts from any mobilization towards true reform because so many 
members of the population are receiving rent and benefitting from an inefficient and 
corrupt state. Rent enables the bureaucracy to grow to such a degree that it begins to 
drain the recourses of the state.  
Rentierism: Mutually Exclusive with Democracy?     
 Civil society has been cited as a prerequisite for democratic transitions, but its 
presence in the Middle East has thus far been insignificant in terms of ushering in true 
reform. In general, “democratic transitions require two developments, one involving the 
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state, the other society.”95 The state cannot alone usher in lasting reform using a top-
down approach, but society cannot force its will on an oppressive regime without any 
support from those at the top of the system. While civil society is imperative for 
democratic sentiment for growth, it “cannot by itself spark the overthrow of an 
authoritarian system and replace it with a democratic system.”96 Rulers with enough 
control have the ability to suppress their populations and support from the regime for 
accountability and liberalization is needed for true change to occur. If the rentier system 
truly does prevent civil society from forming then these nations will forever be at a 
disadvantage in moving towards democracy.  
 Democracy has thus far eluded rentier states because the existing system favors 
the status quo and those in power have no incentive to reform. Conditions have remained 
largely the same throughout the past half century because “genuine democratization 
would threaten the interests both of the regime and of the bourgeoisie.”97 Both those who 
benefit from the distribution of rent and those at the very top of the system would see a 
reduction in their wealth and power if liberalization began to occur. As a result of this 
major impediment to reform “an alliance between the bourgeoisie and the population at 
large is needed for democratization” to occur within the rentier system.98 If both the rent-
seeking bourgeoisie and the common citizens unite to call for change, the regime will not 
be able to ignore the voice of the people. Within the rentier system, one group alone 
cannot call for democratization and it remains to be seen whether or not reforms can be 
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made to the system without the regime increasing its oppression or the bourgeoisie 
blocking change.       
 Historically, the rentier system has played out in Gulf States or other nations that 
suffer from the resource curse. Jordan exists as one of a few nations that are able to 
sustain the same system of rent and patronage without possessing any valuable natural 
resources. Foreign aid and remittances provide the regime with the ability to co-opt its 
own people without having to rely on global oil prices. The downside of this type of 
quasi-rentier state is that the Jordanian government is completely dependent upon the 
nations that provide substantial amounts of aid. Any type of disturbance in world 
economic markets, such as the most recent recession of 2009, greatly restricts the 
resources of nations such as Jordan. Furthermore, economic reforms that would bring 
Jordan into the global marketplace with a liberalized economy are rejected by the 
population because adhering to Western norms of fiscal and monetary police would 
require the regime to drastically cut back the subsidies and patronage networks that have 
been built up since its inception. Although Jordan does have all of the characteristics of a 
rentier state, it faces unique challenges as a result of the sources of its rent.  
Jordan as a Unique Case of Rentierism 
 Jordan fits into the rentier state system as a nation that derives most of its revenue 
from external sources. In general, "elites in a rentier system seek to build a coalition that 
is often detrimental to long term economic growth.”99 By creating such a coalition, the 
rentier can continue to stay in power as long as it provides for the members of the elite. 
Since the creation of Jordan in the early twentieth century "the Hashemite rulers…have 
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constructed a series of distributive institutions- usually at the expense of economic 
development- in order to maintain a highly disparate regime."
100
 The government 
provides for the wealthiest elite group of people and the power it obtains from this group 
solidifies its standing. However, most of the population is excluded from the tremendous 
benefits that the elite group reaps and is left without a way to voice their grievances 
because the nation lacks the institutions that foster political and social change.   
 Since its inception, Jordan's monarchy has relied upon support from its tribal 
population as a cornerstone of regime security. Sharif Hussein ensured the stability of the 
fledgling nation by co-opting Bedouin tribesmen and turning them into a functioning 
military force.
101
 He was then able to secure the boundaries of the newly founded 
Transjordan and continue ruling over the population. In order to win the allegiance of 
these nomadic tribes, Sharif Hussein had to provide them with valuable goods and 
services. Native Jordanians have remained invaluable to the stability of the Hashemite 
family.  Over the years, the regime's liberalization efforts have centered on actions that 
can solidify support from core groups of both TransJordanians from the East Bank, as 
well as the local business community.
102
 Both of these groups provide the popular 
support that the regime needs in order to stay in power. Therefore, government actions 
are often based around providing additional benefits to these two demographic classes. 
 The regime's reliance on tribal support can be traced back to before the Hashemite 
family even gained control of Transjordan. In the film Lawrence of Arabia, Auda ibn 
Tayi states that the Turks give him money to subdue his tribe so that they will not attack 
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passing caravans. In this system, the tribal leaders are given money to subdue their tribe 
and they keep some of the money for themselves while giving the rest to tribesmen.
103
 At 
first the Turks used this system to ensure the safety of caravans and the Hashemite family 
has continued the practice of giving benefits to tribal leaders to ensure their loyalty to the 
government. In order to preserve the stability of the government, tribal leaders needed to 
be given an incentive not to revolt. As the system has progressed, tribes have continued 
to provide necessary support for the Hashemite family and their loyalty is ensured by the 
benefits they reap from external rent.    
 As a rentier state, Jordan provides both of these groups with benefits not available 
to all social classes. While the TransJordanian elite are rewarded with "public jobs and 
subsidies", the business class is given "regulatory protection and state contracts."
104
 The 
regime is able to co-opt both of these groups by granting them special privileges and 
giving them advantages in the workforce. External rents that the Jordanian government 
receives enable it to spend the money on these expensive programs. However, when 
faced with an economic downtown, the regime must adjust its reforms so as to continue 
to appease the population. When the government finds that it can no longer afford to win 
support from its people through economic rewards, it must instead reform its political and 
social institutions in order to maintain power. 
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 Jordan has been consistently plagued by a lack of political participation as a result 
of the rent seeking channels that make public opinion insignificant. While much of the 
political apathy in the kingdom is a result of the population’s frustration with the policies 
of the regime, there are many definitive legal hurdles that any potential political party 
must endure in order to attempt to participate in the system. “According to the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, only 14 of Jordan's 36 political parties were able to 
comply with stiff new regulations that went into effect in 2007. They included obtaining 
certificates of government support and an increase in minimum party membership from 
50 to 500. For various reasons, eight of the opposition coalition's 14 parties couldn't 
comply with the new protocols and had to be dissolved.”105 The blatant lack of diversity 
in the political parties that are allowed to operate within the boundaries of the rentier state 
is a direct result of the restrictions placed on all expressions of public opinion. While 
citizens may wish to find alternative methods of asserting their views, they are often 
prevented from organizing by laws protecting the status quo.  
Jordan’s Foreign Policy as Related to the Rentier State  
 The rentier system in Jordan is inherently opposed to any kind of democratization 
measures. In order for this type of government to maintain its monopoly on power, “the 
search for some form of legitimacy must be at the core of every regime-survival 
strategy.”106 Rentierism can only survive as long as the core group of elites is supported 
economically, and therefore Jordan’s foreign policy has come to rely on the regime 
securing rent from external sources. Especially in today’s international political climate, 
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“talking the donor talk [has become] a prerequisite for political rent-seeking.”107 Jordan’s 
leaders are constantly making foreign policy decisions based on which choice will bring 
more money into the country. Whether a decision is made in order to receive more 
foreign aid, trade agreements, or easier access to loans, the government continues to 
focus their efforts on obtaining more rent instead of improving the lives of citizens or 
moving towards true liberalization and reform.  
 Jordanian foreign policy is intrinsically intertwined with the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Following the first influx of Palestinians into Jordan in 1948, King Hussein granted 
citizenship to all of these refugees and allowed them to carry Jordanian passports. The 
status of these refugees remains a heated political issue even today because Jordan 
receives huge amounts of aid for hosting all of these people. In 1986, King Hussein 
launched an economic development plan for the Occupied Territories.
108
 While this may 
have initially seemed like a magnanimous gesture by the king, it was in reality a political 
move in order to get more aid from the international community. This development plan 
intended to improve the conditions of Palestinian refugees so that they would continue to 
reside in the Occupied Territories and therefore Jordan would continue to receive aid 
from the international community to support them.
109
 King Hussein utilized the conflict 
to the west of Jordan to his advantage and secured more aid to sustain the rentier system 
as a result.  
 Direct aid from the oil producing Gulf States makes up a significant portion of the 
Jordanian budget. The rentier state in Jordan relies is economically vulnerable because of 
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its lack of natural resources and therefore must rely on the export of goods and services, 
as well as direct financial assistance, from Gulf States. While at the beginning of the 
1980s, money flowing into Jordan from remittances and Gulf aid totaled two billion 
dollars a year, out of a four billion dollar gross domestic product.
110
 This flow of money, 
however, remains vulnerable to fluctuations in the oil market. In 1989, the oil shock had 
finally affected Jordan to the point where King Hussein had to reach out to the 
International Monetary Fund in order to obtain financial assistance. By making this step, 
he was forced to implement fiscal austerity measures and adhere to the guidelines of the 
Washington Consensus.
111
 These measures were contrary to the interests of the rentier 
state because they reduced the ability of the regime to co-opt its people. While economic 
conditions forced the king to rely on a new external source of rent, the end result of this 
decision was damaging to the power of the political elites. The money that was given to 
Jordan as a result of the IMF structural adjustment plan did help to sustain the regime, but 
the backlash from the population following the implementation of fiscal austerity 
measures hurt the authority of the government.     
 Another foreign policy move made by King Hussein during the 1980s was the 
creation of the Arab Cooperation Council. This move followed the end of the Iran-Iraq 
War and was meant to facilitate capital and labor flows between Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and 
Yemen.
112
 This agreement was intended to accelerate the money coming into Jordan, 
both from remittances and direct aid. While this agreement fell apart after the First Gulf 
War, its creation shows the importance of securing these sources of external rent. In order 
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for the regime to survive, it needs to constantly be receiving external rent, which it can 
then use to further co-opt the population.  
 Jordan has traditionally relied on Iraq as a source of cheap oil. This economic 
relationship became controversial when Saddam Hussein lost favor with the international 
community. Tensions between Saddam and the West came to a head in 1990 during the 
First Gulf War, when a U.S.-led international coalition attacked in order to push Iraqi 
troops out of Kuwait. Jordan was hesitant in supporting the coalition, and King Hussein’s 
lack of action resulted in a severe cut to the aid Jordan received from the West. Following 
this foreign policy misstep, “Jordanian government officials remain[ed] wary of future 
such diplomatic- and more importantly economic- rifts with external benefactors.”113 
Without the external rent in the form of foreign aid, the rentier system could not continue 
to support the political elites. After the First Gulf War, Jordan’s leaders were careful not 
to oppose actions of the West for fear of losing these funds. 
 Immediately following Jordan’s fall from grace in the eyes of the international 
community, King Hussein revived the standing of his country by putting his efforts into 
alleviating the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1994, Jordan signed an independent peace treaty 
with Israel and was quickly rewarded by an influx of aid into the country. This was 
beneficial to the regime because “the intromission of such international support lowered 
the cost of domestic repression and fulfilled key political needs.”114 Peace with Israel 
meant that the United States “and its allies delivered mounting flows of economic aid and 
security assistance to Amman.”115 Jordan could now rely on a substantial flow of aid 
from the West because it had made peace with Israel. In return, the regime could utilize 
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this money to continue its policies of cooption with the people and maintain their 
monopoly on power.  
 Peace with Israel also gave Jordan indirect economic benefits. Instead of being in 
a constant state of war with its neighbors, Jordan now had access to more commercial 
activities than ever before. These economic benefits included “more tourism; a few joint 
projects; perhaps the cancellation of debts to some industrialized countries…[and] a more 
equitable sharing of water.”116 All of these benefits provided the regime with more tools 
to satisfy both the ruling elite and the general population. Water especially provided a 
valuable benefit to the regime because it allowed the government to distribute water to 
the population and win the favor of the people while continuing to deny true political 
representation.  
 When King Abdullah ascended to the throne, he continued his father’s policies of 
foreign actions based upon securing external rent. Jordan continued to support the United 
States following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. As a reward for supporting 
the West against terrorism, the U.S. doubled its aid package to Jordan and both countries 
signed a free trade agreement.
117
 The king himself travelled to Washington to meet with 
President Bush in order to secure the free trade agreement between these two nations. 
Exports from Jordan to the U.S. rose from 18 million in 1998 to one billion by 2009, 
greatly raising the revenue flowing into Jordan.
118
 These additional funds allowed the 
regime to continue to subvert public opinion by providing goods and services desired by 
the population. During this time period the government expenditures increased while the 
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“rift between state and society was…steadily growing.”119 The Jordanian people 
remained marginally disenfranchised by the rentier system receiving substantial amounts 
of external rent in reward for its pro-West policies.  
 Working with the West to combat terrorism was a calculated play made by many 
Arab regimes. By joining the fight against extremism, these nations “could suppress 
domestic opposition in the name of combating terrorism without raising serious Western 
concerns.”120 Jordan and other Middle Eastern nations were able to still win support in 
the form of American aid by taking steps to catch terrorists. However, in doing so, these 
nations were also allowed to suppress public opinion under the guise of national security. 
The war against terrorism benefitted the Jordanian rentier state because the regime was 
able to secure more aid as a result of its pivotal location in the Middle East.   
 King Abdullah did not stop at placating Western powers to obtain external rent. 
He began by focusing on Jordan’s relations with the oil-wealthy Iraq. Although Iraq still 
had an embargo on its goods according to the United Nations, Jordan broke this embargo 
and sent medical supplies and “high-level government delegations to Baghdad.”121 This 
move enabled Jordan to get back in Saddam’s good graces and therefore continue to 
secure cheap oil from a nearby source. As a resource poor nation, Jordan is forced to rely 
on these external rents in order to maintain the rentier system. By reaching out to Iraq, 
King Abdullah was once again able to utilize foreign policy to maintain the stability of 
the Jordanian system.  
 Having learned its lesson from the First Gulf War, Jordan did not dare to oppose 
the actions of America during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. While King Hussein had chosen 
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to stay out of the international coalition in 1990, King Abdullah made Jordan “a logistical 
linchpin for the Iraqi invasion, providing over-flight to American combat jets and hosting 
thousands of Western military personnel.”122 Although public sentiment sided with Iraq 
during this period of time, the Jordanian government chose to repress the will of the 
people once again and support the cause that would bring them the most foreign revenue. 
Jordan was then further rewarded by a one billion dollar grant in 2003 to compensate for 
the costs incurred during the Iraqi invasion.
123
 As a result of his foreign policy decisions, 
King Abdullah was able to further strengthen the power of the regime.       
 Although Jordan possesses few natural resources, it is still able to sustain a rentier 
system on the external rents it receives. Remittances, foreign aid, and commercial deals 
all contribute to the total rent that the regime needs to survive and therefore the Jordanian 
government must focus its efforts on securing more and more aid. In terms of foreign 
policy, Jordan is able to ally itself both with the West, as well as with its Arab neighbors 
in order to bring in more money. By supporting Western endeavors in the Middle East, as 
well as maintaining good relations in the region, Jordan can have its cake and eat it too in 
terms of foreign financial assistance. The money brought in is used to continuously 
subvert the will of the people and sustain the desires of the ruling political elite.   
 There have been, of course, groups that have challenged the authority of the 
rentier system throughout its history. Whether it was the Palestinian guerrillas of the 
1970s or the Muslim Brotherhood today, the Jordanian government has withstood 
numerous threats to its sovereignty. As opposed to the PLO leaders who wished to take 
control of Jordan in order to bolster their cause against Israel, the Muslim Brotherhood 
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has appeared as a modern day opponent that is focused on undermining the foundations 
of the rentier state. While the true intentions of the Islamist groups in Jordan will not be 
seen until they are allowed to hold a substantial position within the government, it is 
certain that their presence through various social and educational programs has caused 
the regime great anxiety. In providing an alternative method of distributing the goods and 
services that the rentier state wishes to hold a monopoly over, the Muslim Brotherhood 
and its political parties have achieved the status of being the only true opposition to the 
regime.  
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Islamist Influence within the Rentier State 
 Growing Islamist influence across the Middle East has raised questions about the 
intentions of these groups and their social and political goals. While many of these 
organizations appear to support democracy, their aim of promoting a more Islamic 
society causes concern from many Western nations. Within the rentier system that the 
Jordanian regime has cultivated, Islamists represent the only viable opposition group that 
is allowed to function in the political system. While the Muslim Brotherhood has acted 
within the existing institutions in Jordan up to this point in time, its members have 
consistently been blocked from enacting any lasting reforms. The advent of the Arab 
Spring has highlighted the significance of Islamist groups around the region because of 
the strong grassroots support they receive from Arab populations. Islamists would play a 
definitive role in a post-rentier society in Jordan, whether this arises from revolution or 
gradual reform. The Muslim Brotherhood and its political organizations in Jordan have 
displayed the only sustainable opposition to the existing system and although their 
actions have not threatened the existing system up to this point in history, these groups 
will play a significant role if Jordan is to ever move away from rentierism.  
 Organized Islamist influence in the Middle East can be traced back to the advent 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 
1928 by Hassan al-Banna as a social organization but it has, over time, taken on a more 
political tone. In 1945 the organization spread to Jordan and has focused on reforming the 
political system from within since this time.
124
 Today, the Muslim Brotherhood and its 
political wing, the Islamic Action Front, are the main Islamist actors in Jordanian politics 
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and society.
125
 These two complementary groups have utilized social organizations that 
provide goods and services to gain influence in society and currently exercise the most 
power of any opposition party.  
 The IAF does not, however, hold a monopoly on Islamist influence within the 
Jordanian sphere. The Islamic Centrist Party was founded in 2001 as a result of many 
IAF members either leaving or being expelled from the party in the aftermath of the 
Brotherhood’s boycott of Jordanian parliamentary elections.126 While the ICP does not 
exercise as much influence over politics as the far reaching actions of the IAF, its 
presence within the system shows the openness of Islamist parties in Jordan to accept 
democratic norms. Both of these two major parties have consistently worked towards a 
more Islamic society, but they have historically differed on social issues such as women’s 
rights. Between these two parties, different social and political views are made available 
to the Jordanian public, even if the success of the Islamists as a whole in enacting lasting 
change has been questionable.  
Islamist Power as a Social Organization Separate from the Regime 
 Islamist groups have been allowed to function in Jordan as a result of their social 
programs and the popularity of their religious message. The Islamic movement’s “active 
involvement in welfare programs…widespread presence at mosques and other religious 
institutions make their role in Islamizing the public on social and moral issues almost 
uncontested” by other groups.127 As a result of the fact that they function through social 
and not political outlets, Islamists are able to win favor with the population while not 
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threatening the regime. Specifically the Brotherhood has concentrated its actions through 
Islamic nongovernmental organizations such as “schools, health care, religious lessons, 
and youth programs, all designed to promote Islamic values and behavior.”128 These 
apolitical actions have allowed the Brotherhood to expand its influence throughout the 
kingdom without incurring government sanctions or other pejorative action.  
 Beyond simply gaining popularity with the Jordanian people, the Brotherhood and 
other Islamist groups have enjoyed privileged status with regard to the government that 
has translated into political successes. Its social actions have allowed the Islamist 
movement to avoid the restrictions that have been placed on political parties in Jordan 
and “not only was [the Brotherhood] permitted to organize when all other political 
organizations in the country were banned during the martial law period, but it has been 
allowed to expand the scope of its activities, broadening the reach of its appeal.”129 Many 
of its actions are looked upon favorably by the regime because these social programs help 
segments of the population that would otherwise be unhappy with the ineffectiveness 
with many existing government programs. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood has 
gained widespread popularity throughout Jordan without attracting negative attention 
from the government itself.  
 While Islamist actions in Jordan may have began as purely social programs, their 
popularity has aided their marginal political successes within the existing rentier system. 
One of the largest Brotherhood programs in Jordan has been the Islamic Center Charity 
Society. Although this and other Islamist programs do “not directly engage in politics, 
there is a political effect. Beneficiaries provide political support to the Brotherhood 
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because of its social services.”130 The popular support that the Brotherhood has built up 
over the last century in Jordan has translated into political successes when parliamentary 
and municipal candidates associated with the IAF run for office. Although political 
parties have been banned for many years in Jordan, Islamist candidates are able to run for 
their organization unofficially because of the reputable social programs run by the 
Brotherhood.  
 Additionally, the Islamist movement has gained traction with the population by 
remaining an organization that does not receive rent from the regime. When King 
Hussein outlawed political parties in the 1950s, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to 
continue its social interactions with the population while other organizations ceased to 
operate. During this ban, Brotherhood members were rewarded for their loyalty to the 
regime through King Hussein “appointing them as government ministers, particularly of 
the Ministry of Education, in conjunction with a policy of repressing other political forces 
in the Kingdom.”131 Islamists were then able to influence social policy from within the 
regime during a period of time when all other parties were blocked from operating. When 
parties granted the ability to function within the political system with the liberalization 
measures of 1989, the Muslim Brotherhood found itself in a much better position to win 
seats in parliament than any of the other fledgling parties.
132
 Their considerable influence 
since this point in time is no doubt a result of the favorable treatment they received from 
the regime during the ban on political parties.  
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 Following these political liberalization measures, the Muslim Brotherhood was 
able to exercise the most power of any organization, even if the regime still restricted all 
opposition parties. Once in power, Islamists were able to join together with liberals and 
leftists and “sit together in opposition blocs and coordinate activities against the state.”133 
While the government still blocked any true reform to the system, an opposition voice led 
by the IAF represented the strongest challenge to regime authority. Many of these 
opposition groups did not have many common goals beyond their disagreements with the 
government. “Their ability to unite under a common banner masked real divisions within 
and between” the two main demographic groups in Jordan, the East Bank Jordanians and 
the Palestinians.
134
 Islamists may represent the most formidable opposition to the regime, 
but their power remains marginalized by inherent divisions among political parties.  
Historical Influence in Politics  
 Liberalization measures taken by King Hussein in 1989 greatly altered the 
political landscape in Jordan. Islamists achieved favorable election results during this 
year because they were able to function as a welfare society and therefore spread their 
message horizontally in the wake of the ban on political parties. Furthermore, they 
presented an organized, highly disciplined group of only 30 candidates instead of other 
secular groups with more than 700 candidates.
135
 The social welfare programs that were 
allowed to operate within the constraints of the ban on political parties had given the 
Islamists the popular support that they needed in order to win seats when parties were 
allowed to run for office. Concrete results showed that “the fact that the Muslim Brothers 
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were the only established political grouping in Jordan” in fact allowed Islamists to win 32 
of the 80 available seats in the 1989 parliamentary elections.
136
 This represented a 
considerable victory for the Brotherhood and provided Islamists with the power that they 
needed to bring up social change within the existing political system. Islamist candidates 
won these seats legally and their welfare programs enabled them to obtain the popularity 
that was necessary to give a plurality in parliament to an opposition group.  
 Although Islamist candidates gained the plurality they needed to enact reform in 
1989, they were blocked from taking any actions that challenged the authority of the 
regime. Islamists lost favor with the regime after they began to openly oppose actions of 
the government in calling attention to government corruption and attempting to indict 
former Prime Minister Zayid al-Rifai.
137
 King Hussein perceived these actions as a threat 
to his power and the power of the regime as a whole and he began to step back on his 
liberalization measures. The number of Islamist members in parliament dropped from 32 
to 22 in 1993 because the rules of the game were “legally ‘managed’” by the regime 
before elections took place.
138
 These actions were taken openly by the regime and 
restricted the popularity of political parties because the one-man one-vote electoral law 
that was adopted by the Jordanian government caused tribal affiliations to dictate the 
outcome of elections. Political parties and Islamist candidates could not win votes over 
tribal candidates when the public was forced to only have one vote. Utilizing strictly 
measures kept the regime from suffering at the hands of their actions and allowed them to 
restrict the political power of Islamists and other opposition parties.  
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Islamist Actions with Regard to the Women’s Movement 
 Islamist organizations in Jordan have a strong track record of rhetoric supporting 
women’s rights and women’s roles in public life. Specifically, IAF’s electoral platform in 
2007 supported an active public role for women.
139
 The more moderate ICP announced a 
positive opinion of a women’s quota in Jordanian politics.140 This quota would have 
enabled women to win seats in parliament in areas where they previously could not 
garner the public support to win. Both of these statements by Islamist parties have shown 
theoretical support for women’s rights in a traditionally male dominated political system, 
but neither organization has taken concrete steps to elevate the position of women in 
politics.             
 While Islamist organizations have not revealed themselves as the best advocates 
of women’s rights, their actions have remained ambiguous on this issue. The Higher 
Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties (HCCNOP) is dominated 
by Islamist parties and specifically the “IAF is very proud of its participation in the 
HCCNOP and claims that it is a democratic model for the Arab world.”141 IAF actions 
within this organization have shown the rhetoric of the Islamist party pan out on the 
political front. Islamists have used their power in the HCCNOP in order to take all other 
measures besides the moderately effective women’s quota off of the negotiating table. 
The official reasoning for these actions was that the women’s quota, unlike more 
controversial issues such as citizenship and divorce, was not an issue that was mandated 
by Islam.
142
 This lack of enthusiasm on the part of Islamists regarding women’s rights 
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has contradicted descriptions of Islamist organizations as embracing democracy. If the 
IAF and the ICP were to follow through on their declarations of support for the women’s 
movement in Jordan they could truly be portrayed as moderate, liberal organizations.    
 Islamists have also utilized anti-Western sentiment to justify their actions against 
women’s rights. The IAF opposed both a divorce law and an honor crimes law that would 
have given women more rights in Jordan. Their reasoning for doing so remains 
ambiguous, however, “publicly, the IAF aligned their objections to the laws within a 
larger context of the regime’s Western, secular vision for Jordan in contrast to the Arab, 
Islamic identity that the IAF presumably is defending; in doing so, it was supported by 
many tribal MPs.”143 Even though Islamic law grants women with more rights regarding 
divorce than Jordanian secular law currently does, the IAF was able to justify the 
repression of women’s rights by masking their opinions behind anti-Western sentiment. 
Even the more moderate ICP has balked at providing women with more rights. The ICP 
wrote a letter to the Prime Minister in 2010 calling for a retreat from the ratification of 
the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) on the grounds that the convention conflicted with Islam’s view of the 
complementary roles of men and women in society and that CEDAW promoted a foreign 
agenda.
144
 Public sentiment against foreign intervention in Jordanian affairs is so strong 
that Islamist organizations are sure to find support for any of their actions if they are 
justified as actions against foreign intervention. Islamist actions in favor of and against 
the women’s movement have remained unclear in the political system because these any 
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concrete stance taken by these parties is masked behind a veil of nationalism and Islamic 
pride over secular values.  
Islamist Actions with Regard to Democracy 
 While Islamists are often associated with theocratic governments across the 
Middle East, the organizations that exist within Jordan have openly supported 
democracy. Historically, “the Islamist movement in Jordan has been consistently in the 
forefront of democratizing the Jordanian polity since liberalization began in 1989.”145 
Regardless of whether or not Islamist organizations truly support a representative 
government, they have proven themselves able to act within a democratic system over the 
past thirty years. The amount of seats that the IAF won in the 1989 elections showed 
exactly how “Jordan’s Islamists have proved themselves to be capable democrats, 
obeying the rules of the political game while parlaying their strength in society into a 
parliamentary plurality.”146 By acting within the existing system, Islamists were able to 
win their political power legally and begin to act upon the statements they had been 
making in favor of reform.  
 Beyond simply supporting democracy at its initial stages, Islamist groups in 
Jordan have always demonstrated their commitment to representative government and 
their willingness to work within existing political boundaries. Some Middle Eastern 
Islamists support democracy only to achieve a position of power and then shift positions 
to maintaining an Islamic theocracy, but “Jordanian Islamists are careful to link Islam 
with democracy itself.”147 Basic tenants of Islam support democracy and, unlike some 
fundamentalist groups in the Middle East, the IAF has not reneged on its initial efforts at 
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working within a republic. Furthermore, “despite its advocacy of a more Islamic society, 
the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has never sought a radical or revolutionary change in 
political arrangements that would threaten the survival of the regime.”148 Islamist support 
for democracy in a way that does not fundamentally challenge the stability of the 
monarchy has aided the IAF and the ICP in remaining politically relevant without being 
restrained by government limitations.   
 While Islamist groups have supported the liberalization process in Jordan, they 
are often given advantages over other opposition groups by the government itself. “In 
Jordan, the regime benefits from Muslim Brotherhood success because as a moderate 
reform movement it checks other more confrontational social movements and channels 
Islamic activism into a non-violent agenda.”149 This Islamist group functions as an 
opposition group that still supports the existence of the monarchy and this has allowed 
them to become the favored opposition group. The Muslim Brotherhood has been given 
privileged status by the government because they countered both pan-Arab leftists and 
the extreme right-wing Islamists that opposed the regime.
150
 Most other opposition 
groups have historically disagreed with fundamental decisions of the monarchy and they 
have therefore been blocked from voicing their opinions while the Muslim Brotherhood 
has continued to be able to operate within the regime. As long as these groups continue to 
abide by the rules of the game, they are not considered to be serious threats to the 
government and their moderate opposition is utilized by the king to show his support of a 
representative system.   
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Islamist Relations with Rent-seeking Groups 
 The extent to which the Islamists have been able to function within the rentier 
system has been heavily dependent upon the relationships between these groups and other 
rent-seeking organizations. In the beginning, “the movement [had] been led by 
established East Bank families, traditionally a primary source of support for the 
Hashemites [which meant that] the regime [could] crack down on the Islamist elements, 
but not very hard.”151 While the East Bankers represent a minority of the Jordanian 
population, they hold the majority of the political power in the country and the regime 
has avoided upsetting this group for fear that it will damage the legitimacy of the 
government itself. The fact that many East Bankers support a transition to a more Islamic 
society has meant that these two groups have been intrinsically linked in the political 
process. 
 Despite the original outpouring of support from powerful groups within the 
rentier state, Islamists have not remained in a privileged position with regard to the 
regime. A changing of demographic support for the Islamists caused them to lose favor 
with the regime in the beginning of the 1990s. Their support began to come from the 
younger, poorer segments of society, as well as from the Palestinian portion of the 
population. None of these new areas of demographic support receive rent from the regime 
and cannot exercise as much power as the East Bankers.
152
 As a direct result of the shift 
in demographic support for Islamists, the regime has been less inclined to allow Islamist 
power to continue to grow. Palestinian support for the Islamists has certainly not been as 
valuable as the initial East Bank support for these fledgling political parties. 
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 Although the base of support for Islamist groups has shifted to a segment of the 
population that does not receive rent from the regime, these political parties have 
maintained their good standing with the regime. Specifically the IAF has been considered 
as “loyal opposition” because the Muslim Brotherhood acts through existing “institutions 
of the political system.”153 As opposed to a more radical group that would act to 
overthrow the monarchy and make significant changes to parliament, the IAF is favored 
as a group that can prove the regime’s commitment to democracy without pushing for 
true change within the system. Historically, “the Jordanian movement has enjoyed a 
relatively cordial and cooperative relationship with the Hashemite monarchy” and has 
been able to expand their influence as a result of the preferential treatment they are given 
by the regime.
154
 This positive relationship has allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to 
continue its civil society activities and gain even more popular support. Islamist groups 
are the only opposition groups who have been allowed to maintain and even expand their 
actions without facing restrictive action from the regime and as a result they have 
emerged as the strongest opposition group in Jordan.  
Islamists and the Arab Spring 
 Popular uprisings throughout the Middle East appeared to usher in a wave of 
democracy beginning in January 2011. Since that time it has remained unclear whether or 
not these protests were fueled by Islamist sentiment or secular, democratic motives. At 
the current time, the Middle East is “experiencing a resurgence of Islamic activism fueled 
by rampant poverty, increasing unemployment and underemployment, as well as 
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disillusion with secular rule and Western influence.”155 Whether or not this wave of 
protests will bring positive change to the region, it is certain that that the “the Arab 
Spring…has accelerated this reactionary Islamist trend.”156 Islamist groups elsewhere in 
the Middle East may be more radical than in Jordan, but the actions of the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a whole will undoubtedly impact the future successes of Islamist parties 
in the kingdom.  
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Can Jordan’s Rentierism Survive the Arab Spring? 
 In the spring of 2012, a wave of protests rippled through the Middle East and 
destabilized some of the most entrenched regimes in the region. Beginning in Tunisia, 
this series of revolts then spread to Egypt, Libya, and Syria. While these revolutionary 
events occurred mainly in Arab republics, even the monarchies were not spared from the 
popular sentiment calling for more representation. Shortly after the first wave of protests 
began, Jordan began to experience public calls for political and economic reform. Groups 
traditionally loyal to the regime, such as the East Bank Jordanians, even joined in the 
protests and caused concern for the overall stability of the state. The regime has largely 
resorted to its traditional methods of handling discontent, including increasing subsidies, 
cutting taxes, and changing ministers in order to quiet the calls for reform and even 
revolution. While in the short term these tactics have helped to push back against the tide 
of protests, they have not solved the underlying economic and political problems facing 
the Hashemite Kingdom. As long as these issues remain the regime will not be stable and 
the popular discontent with the rentier state’s exclusive policies will continue to grow.    
The Arab Spring in a Jordanian Context 
 When compared with the turmoil that has engulfed the Middle East in the past 
fifty years, Jordan has stood out as a relatively stable entity that maintained cordial 
relations with all of its neighbors. In 1992, Jordan achieved the highest ever Freedom 
House score for an Arab country. However, it appears that its liberalization measures 
peaked during this year as well.
157
 In conjunction with mandated World Bank 
privatization measures in the 1990s, the Jordanian regime has restricted many civil 
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liberties in order to maintain the power of the government. Under the current system, 
Jordan has “one of the region’s weakest political party systems and one of its most 
unrepresentative parliaments” in addition to completely excluding opposition members 
from the last parliament.
158
 While these conditions would have sparked protests much 
earlier than the spring of 2011, the foreign aid given to the rentier system allowed its 
stability to continue much longer than would have been sustainable without generous 
external donors.     
 The Jordanian government has been able to avoid criticism of its lack of popular 
representation because of its status as the sole stable Western ally in the Middle East. 
Jordanian “authorities retain several assets: popular anxiety about instability; U.S. and 
Gulf Arab political and material support; and persistent intercommunal divisions within 
the opposition.”159 This combination of conditions blocking reform has allowed the 
rentier state in Jordan to survive various political and economic crises since its inception. 
Even the most dissatisfied citizens under the regime would not have wanted the country 
to fall into chaos and therefore they held back their opposition to the regime. Foreign 
donors relied upon Jordan as a key ally in the region and therefore continued to fund the 
rentier state’s activities. Finally, divisions between the two main groups of the 
population, the East Bankers and the Palestinian-Jordanians, prevented a unified 
opposition group from surfacing. While the regime may have experienced temporary 
periods of turmoil, all of these conditions have allowed it to continue the rentier policies 
that have existed since its inception.  
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 When protests erupted in Egypt and Tunisia in the spring of 2011, Jordan was not 
safe from the wave of popular discontent sweeping through the region. The first protests 
in Jordan were recorded on 25 March 2011, about a month after Egypt’s protests had 
reached critical mass and become a true revolt.
160
 While these protests took longer to 
begin than in other Arab nations, the implications were just as severe for the regime. 
Protesters gathered largely in the urban areas of Amman and demonstrated against high 
taxes, the rising price of commodities and the lack of jobs.
161
 All of these problems were 
and continue to be economic issues plaguing the Jordanian population, and the Arab 
Spring brought forth an opportunity to attempt to significantly reform the system. At this 
point in time, it was unclear whether Jordan would remain a stable entity amid turmoil in 
the Middle East, or whether these protests would spur on a revolt against the government.  
 Historically, the East Bank Jordanians had represented the foundation of power 
for the rentier state. Traditionally Jordanians of East Bank descent had supported the 
regime because they were given “over-representation in the public sector, the security 
services, and…parliament.”162 However, their position of power was threatened when 
privatization measures were implemented in the 1990s and suddenly this group began to 
find the suggestions of Islamist opposition groups more appealing than the tactics of the 
regime. These building tensions between the regime and the East Bankers culminated in 
this group joining Palestinians and Islamists in demonstrations against the government in 
the spring of 2011.
163
 This undoubtedly caused concern within the government because 
the group fundamentally responsible for supporting the government had appeared to join 
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the opposition. It was clear that the tried and true methods of the regime for mitigating 
public discontent would not be accepted by the population after the beginning of the Arab 
Spring. 
 The East Bankers turning against the government represented a significant shift in 
the development of demonstrations in Jordan. However, differences still remained among 
the opposition groups regarding the specific reforms that needed to be implemented. The 
East Bankers were calling for an end to corruption and economic inequalities in society, 
which were commonly agreed upon issues by most opposition members.
164
 All groups 
were, however, not united in their suggested paths toward reform. Palestinians and 
Islamists generally supported a more democratic and representative system as the 
solution to the problems within the rentier system. However, a state that fairly distributed 
representation to the population would increase the power of Palestinians.
165
 Therefore, 
the East Bankers were not demanding democracy and were merely protesting their lack 
of economic favor over the past two decades. While this group joining the protests 
represented a huge blow to the credibility of the regime, their demands for reform did not 
align with those of other opposition groups and therefore did not support the calls for 
democracy of other protesters.  
 Another factor that contributed to the less than revolutionary results of the 
Jordanian Spring was the existence of certain laws preventing overt criticism of the 
government. Jordanians who wished to express their disapproval of the regime were 
forced to criticize the government specifically, and not the actual regime or king. Under 
Jordanian law, “criticism of the king and the royal family is a punishable crime” and 
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many journalists and opposition members have faced jail time for outspoken comments 
against the Hashemites.
166
 This law effectively prevents any negative comments about the 
royal family from being articulated in the public sphere and gives the appearance that 
every member of the kingdom fully supports the king. While calls for reform addressed 
many economic and social grievances, these demonstrations could not reach the heart of 
the issues of the rentier system without being allowed to critique the actions of the few at 
the top of the system.  
Foreign and Domestic Reactions to the Jordanian Spring 
 Jordan was long regarded as a pillar of stability and reform in the Middle East, 
and the turmoil created by protests in the spring of 2011 was extremely worrisome to the 
financial supporters of the regime. As the largest foreign donor on the Jordanian stage, 
the United States viewed its interests as being fundamentally threatened during the wave 
of popular protests that demanded substantial reform. The Hashemite Kingdom is the 
second largest recipient of American aid, which totaled $818 million in 2010.
167
 As a 
result of this substantial investment in the Jordanian system, the United States has relied 
upon Jordan to maintain its stability in the Middle East and to serve as its ally among 
many hostile regimes in the region. Instead of supporting what appeared to be a truly 
democratic movement calling for reform, the United States increased its annual aid by 
$100 million and promised another $400 to the kingdom through the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation immediately after the Arab Spring broke out.
168
 This influx of 
foreign aid helped the regime to continue its use of security systems and subsidies in 
order to quell popular dissent. American aid played a pivotal role in ensuring the 
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continuation of the rentier policies of the government, even at a time when entrenched 
regimes around the region were falling victim to popular calls for revolution.  
 In addition to Western supporters of the Jordanian regime, Saudi Arabia had often 
relied on Jordanian stability to serve its own interests. The Saudi-Jordanian border lies 
across a patch of desert, but the ties of these two nations lie much deeper below the 
surface. The Hashemites have lamented the loss of the Arabian Peninsula since it was 
taken over by the Saud family and have continued to accept aid from their oil wealthy 
southern neighbor despite the fact that they view themselves as the rightful guardians of 
the holy sites of Mecca and Medina. In response to the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia 
extended an invitation for Jordan to join the Gulf Cooperation Council, although Jordan 
is not located on the Persian Gulf and does not possess any oil resources. This action 
would give the Jordanian government much more access to financial aid from wealthy 
Gulf nations and would allow the GCC states to pursue a five year development plan to 
continue Jordan’s foreign assistance.169 This increased aid would again allow the regime 
to continue its co-optive measures and ensure that the Jordanian monarch would not fall 
victim to the same fate as Hosni Mubarak or Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Saudi Arabia’s 
government views Jordan as a substantial element to its own stability because the 
Jordanian monarchy holds traditional support from many of the same groups that are 
needed to prop up the Saudi regime.    
 Domestically, the executive and security systems have hindered past reforms and 
their presence in the current government has diminished any hope of true democracy 
coming to fruition. King Abdullah II’s “desire to engineer the process from above has 
gone hand in hand with a resistance to any constitutional revisions that would dilute the 
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power of the throne”170 and has therefore stopped any true movements toward democracy 
from occurring. In addition to the overarching power of the king, his security apparatus, 
the General Intelligence Department, or muhkabaraht, has consistently been given power 
over approving or rejecting cabinets and deters reform in addition to restricting academic 
freedom.
171
 The presence of the muhkabaraht in society deters members of the opposition 
from truly speaking out against the regime for fear of retribution or exclusion from 
receiving rent. Both the executive and the security forces have a vested interest in 
maintaining the status quo of the rentier state and have continued to reject any type of 
reform that would decrease their power.  
 In the past the king has relied upon the creation of national platforms in order to 
placate dissent within the regime and to encourage a sense of Jordanian nationality that 
would deter opposition from surfacing. The past decade has yielded three major 
platforms, ‘Jordan First’ in 2002, the ‘National Agenda’ in 2005 and ‘We Are All Jordan’ 
in 2006. While all of these programs were awarded significant media attention and 
funding, none of them made any real improvements on political or civil issues.
172
 In 
response to the renewed strength of the 2011 protests, the regime again turned to a new 
national agenda in order to placate the calls for reform. In March 2011, the National 
Dialogue Committee was established with the goal of proposing new reforms to the 
election law; however the implementation of its suggestions, including an open 
proportional list system, was not promised.
173
 In addition to this lack of commitment to 
implementing reforms, this committee did not include any members of opposition 
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movements. By resorting to the same type of tactic utilized before the Arab Spring, the 
regime demonstrated its lack of willingness to commit to any action greater than façade 
reforms.  
 Furthermore, the National Dialogue Committee and the ensuing Economic 
Dialogue Committee were not given a fair chance at credibility by the regime. The IAF 
boycotted both of these committees in order to protest their lack of inclusion of 
opposition voices and caused both of these groups to lose credibility as a result.
174
 The 
large amount of popularity that the IAF holds among Jordanians has given it the power to 
counteract the actions of the regime simply by boycotting committees or elections. 
Although these committees “initially dampened street mobilisation”, they were not 
enough to convince the population that true reform would follow and therefore 
dissatisfaction of East Bankers and Islamists alike continued.
175
 Islamist groups in Jordan 
recognized that the regime was resorting to tactics of the past and called public attention 
to these committees through their boycott, which then urged on protests against the same 
problems that the committees were claiming to address.  
 Both a domestic stimulus program and the reshuffling of cabinet ministers were 
tactics employed by the regime to draw attention away from the inevitable resurgence of 
rentier policies. In January of 2011, King Abdullah II implemented a JD 160 million 
emergency plan that would decrease taxes and increase various subsidies throughout the 
country in order to spread more rent to more areas of the population and co-opt people 
previously dissatisfied with economic conditions.
176
 Although this is an action often 
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taken by rentier governments in response to popular unrest, it did not prevent protesters 
from gathering to march in downtown Amman regardless of economic subsidies. 
 While the population is tiring of the same rentier policies being played out time 
and time again, these actions are mitigating popular unrest inside the country. Although 
there is no way to argue that these actions represent sustainable movement toward 
reform, “this mix of tactics arguably has worked. Protesters have failed to reach critical 
mass” and the country has returned to business as usual.177 The creation of new 
committees along with the influx of aid into the economic system has, for the time being, 
seemed to lull the protesters into hoping that this cycle of façade reforms will turn into 
true liberalization measures. Additionally, the developing humanitarian crisis in Syria has 
deterred Jordanian demonstrators from pursuing any type of violent revolt against the 
government.
178
 Only time will tell if these actions will placate the people for a few 
months or years before another wave of protests breaks out.  The king also replaced 
Prime Minister Rifai with Marouf al-Bakhit, who has reportedly bad relations with the 
Muslim Brotherhood.
179
 This move, in conjunction with the infusion of money into the 
economy, demonstrates how the regime is relying on old tactics to solve an evolving 
problem. Although these domestic factors have appeared to calm protestors they cannot 
change the fundamental issues without reforming the entire system. 
Fall 2012: A Jordanian Spring? 
 While initially the kingdom remained insulated from the popular protests that had 
toppled many entrenched regimes around the Middle East, eventually Jordan had to face 
the harsh realities of the economic downturn. In early November 2012, the government 
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chose to cut fuel subsidies in order to secure a two billion dollar IMF loan.
180
 While 
fiscally this decision made sense, the government certainly did not anticipate the level of 
public anger that would erupt as a result of these price increases. Specifically, cutting 
subsidies led to increases of “50 percent for bottled gas used for cooking, 33 percent for 
diesel and kerosene for transport and heating and 14 percent on lower grade petrol.”181 
The average Jordanian was disproportionately impacted by these higher prices because 
they had become reliant on artificially low prices, especially with regard to cooking gas. 
Protesters gathered in one of the main traffic circles in Amman immediately following 
the announcement of higher prices and caused many to wonder whether this action would 
bring the downfall of the Jordanian government.  
 Demonstrations in reaction to subsidy cuts are not a new occurrence in Jordan. 
Austerity measures that decreased food subsidies in 1988 fueled violent protests in the 
southern city of Maan, which is known for the presence of Jordanian Muslim militants. 
While the protests during the 1980s were some of the most violent that have ever taken 
place against the regime, they did eventually force more liberalization measures to be 
taken by the government in the form of removing martial law and holding parliamentary 
elections.
182
 Similar economic circumstances existed during the previous Maan riots as 
well, with an economic recession forcing the Jordanian government to implement budget 
cuts in order to receive financial assistance from the IMF. In the context of the Arab 
Spring, the renewed unrest in both urban and rural areas could encourage the regime to 
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truly implement liberalization measures that would increase popular representation in 
government.  
 While the regime initially expected many of the protesters to be Islamists or their 
sympathizers, the crowds represented a diverse segment of the Jordanian population. The 
demonstrations were said to be led by mostly middle class, secular opposition, instead of 
the extremists that the government made them out to be.
183
 Despite the new makeup of 
the crowds, the protesters faced the same obstacles that prevented the population from 
demanding change before the Arab Spring. Some groups were demanding raising 
subsidies back to previous levels, others wanted a crackdown on corruption and still 
others wanted the abdication of the king.
184
 The division of the crowds detracted from 
their overall impact and the government was able to delay action because there was not 
one unified message from the opposition. The diversity of the population actively 
protesting against the government brought strength in numbers to voices of reform. 
Unfortunately, the lack of unity in demands detracted from the overall effectiveness of 
the demonstrators.  
 Legal hurdles also prevented the protests from reaching critical mass during the 
Fall of 2012. The fact that criticism of the king or the royal family had the potential to 
land protesters in prison for up to three years was enough to prevent some of the more 
moderate opposition from speaking out against the government. However, the crowds did 
not shy away from specifically mentioning the king in their demonstrations. A popular 
protest chant in Amman quickly became “freedom is from God, in spite of you 
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Abdullah.”185 Those who joined in these chants did not do so without fear of the law, and 
many citizens experienced the wrath of the security forces after participating in these 
chants. Over 130 protesters were questioned by the mukhabarat following their calls for 
the downfall of the monarchy during demonstrations.
186
 Restrictive laws protecting the 
monarchy prevented protesters from speaking their minds in the past and served as a 
warning to those who choose to criticize the king in this round of demonstrations. The 
all-encompassing nature of the security forces and intelligence agents continued to block 
citizens from making their demands for change stronger after the beginning of the Arab 
Spring.  
January 2013 Parliamentary Elections 
 In the year leading up to the most recent set of Jordanian parliamentary elections, 
the government has made an effort to appease the protesters demand of forging a more 
representative system. The Independent Elections Committee (IEC) was formed in May 
2012 as a regulatory agency that would ensure free and fair elections were taking place 
the following January. A watchdog agency was especially important during this most 
recent election cycle because of the changes that King Abdullah II announced to the 
election reform law in 2012. January 2013 represented the first time that voters were able 
to vote for two candidates, one at the national level and one on a local district level.
187
  
Although the government publicized this change as a substantial step towards democratic 
reform, doubts still remained among the population as to whether their representation 
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would actually increase as a result of this new law. By consistently paying lip service to 
reform but failing to truly give more power to the people, the regime has lost the 
confidence of many of its citizens.  
 While there was not much popular faith in the IEC leading up to the elections, the 
commission did make a concerted effort to address concerns about validity of polling 
results. Initially the 27
th
 seat at the national level was recorded as being won by a former 
minister, Hazem Qashou, complaints were lodged against this result and the votes were 
recounted. After the recount it was determined that the seat had in fact been won by a 
leftist leader named Abla Abu Olbeh.
188
 The willingness of the commission to allow a 
leftist leader into power instead of a former minister who would have been more 
complacent with the regime’s policies showed a true effort towards transparency and 
reform on the part of the government. While the regime may not have envisioned a leftist 
leader winning this seat, it still allowed the commission to operate independently of the 
government and did not step in to fabricate more favorable results.  
 This set of municipal elections presented an opportunity for the regime to show 
that it was truly committed to democratic reforms and a more open government system. 
In a surprising turn of events, the Islamic Centrist Party won “16 seats in the January 23 
polls, including three through the national list competition and 13 in district-level 
races.”189 This substantial plurality won by the Islamists has given leaders within the ICP 
the necessary support for a coalition that they intend to build that will form the next 
government. While King Abdullah expressed that this new parliament would be the basis 
for creating a national program that would aid the formation of a new government, it 
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remains to be seen whether the regime will allow an Islamist party to hold this much 
power in politics. While the rentier state has allowed the results of this election to stand, 
an Islamist dominated government will certainly pose a threat to the elite rent seeking 
groups.   
 
Khaled Neimat, "Majority Says Elections Were Free and Fair — Survey,"The Jordan Times, February 20, 
2013, http://jordantimes.com/majority-says-elections-were-free-and-fair----survey. 
 Despite the positive reviews given to the election process that resulted in 
moderate Islamist victories, the Muslim Brotherhood did not participate in the 2013 
elections. The IAF, acting as the Muslim Brotherhood’s affiliate, boycotted elections in 
order to protest the electoral law, which the group feels prevents its members from 
gaining the seats that they hold the popularity to win in reality.
190
 While the actual 
influence of the Brotherhood is debatable because its members have never been able to 
                                                 
190
 "Jordan's Parliament Chooses PM for the First Time," Al-Jazeera, March 9, 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/03/201339193556710937.html.  
81 
 
run in free and fair elections in Jordan, the absence of this party definitely hindered the 
democratic viability of these elections. Democracy once again was undermined by the 
rentier system, which allowed moderate Islamists of the ICP to run fairly but restricted 
the success of the IAF in the most recent electoral law reform to the degree that the 
Muslim Brotherhood decided it could make a bigger political statement by removing 
itself from the elections entirely.  
 Beside the obvious reforms made in the elections process, the Jordanian regime 
has also promised to bring more popular participation into the selection of the next prime 
minister. While the swapping of ministers has frequently been used by the king to satisfy 
opposition demands, King Abdullah II announced in February 2012 that he will consult 
parliament before choosing the next prime minister of the nation.
191
 This announcement 
represented a significant change from the tactics typically employed by the rentier state in 
order to keep control of the political system. King Abdullah did safeguard his 
announcement by stating that consulting parliament would only be successful “if there is 
a national consensus on the elections law that led to this parliament.”192 By inserting this 
conditionality into his promise to include the voice of the people in the position of prime 
minister, the king left himself space to ignore the recommendations of an Islamist-
dominated parliament and continue his practice of appointing a prime minister loyal to 
the regime.  
 In a historic measure, Jordan’s parliament voted to elect a prime minister in 
March 2013. Although King Abdullah had often used the mechanism of the post of prime 
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minister to quell demands for reform, he did follow through on his promise to give more 
power to popularly elected officials instead of arbitrarily chosen leaders. Parliament 
members selected Abdullah Ensour to serve in this position for the next four years.
193
 
While this historic move towards a more democratic system should be celebrated, the 
significance of this event has been hindered by the fact that Mr. Ensour is “committed 
enough to Abdullah's plan for cautious reforms to be the king's choice for prime minister 
in October” 2012.194 Therefore this action needs to be put into the context of the political 
situation in Jordan over the six months preceding elections, when Ensour was also prime 
minister. If Ensour was enough of a favored member of the regime to be chosen by King 
Abdullah II prior to elections, then his credibility as a true champion of reform needs to 
be questioned. While Ensour’s actual tactics have not been seen in the long term, he was 
serving as prime minister during the fall 2012 riots and therefore has managed the 
administration of rentier politics in the past. The decision of parliament to choose a 
favorite of the regime is disappointing and their symbolic gesture of democracy will most 
likely not result in true change within the kingdom.  
 The cabinet members chosen by Ensour in March 2013 indicate a commitment to 
continue reform. Eighteen ministers were chosen by Ensour to be part of the nation’s 
seventy-seventh cabinet, and the thirteenth that has been formed while King Abdullah II 
has been in power. While some members of the previous cabinet remained in their posts, 
the majority of the ministers have not previously held such positions.
195
 The most 
significant of the new appointments is that of Umayya Toukan, a strong supporter of 
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fiscal reforms, as the finance minister. Toukan has previously advocated implementing 
economic reforms in order for Jordan to fulfill the prerequisites that stand for receiving 
additional IMF aid. In Jordan’s case, these IMF loans could amount to 385 million dollars 
by as early as April 2013.
196
 While the liberalization measures, such as cutting subsidies, 
would help Jordan conform to Western norms and attain viability in globalized markets, 
the additional funds from the IMF will only allow the perpetuation of rentier policies. 
The selection of new cabinet members has proved that Prime Minister Ensour will 
continue to support marginal reform; however, it is unclear whether these reforms will 
bring democracy or simply a stronger economy under an autocratic ruler.  
Possible Paths toward Reform  
 While Jordan is certainly not the only state in the Middle East facing the tough 
choice between harsh reforms now or revolution later, the economic situation presented 
in the Hashemite Kingdom is certainly unique. The Jordanian regime must find a way to 
alter the rentier system without completely losing the power that they currently hold. In 
the short term, the reshuffling of cabinet appointments and increasing subsidies have 
quelled dissent but the economic system of rentierism will prove to be unsustainable in 
the future. Jordan’s “long-run goal must be to dismantle the rentier state where it is 
possible, and loosen its grip on the rest of the economy.”197 The Arab Spring has shown 
that when rentierism controls the entire economy of a nation, the only viable option for 
reform often comes through revolution. In order to avoid the violence and turmoil 
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experienced by other fallen regimes during the past two years the Jordanian government 
must begin to release some of its control over the economy immediately.  
 Foreign donors may be the most influential in convincing the Jordanian regime to 
curb its exclusionary rentier policies. As the largest foreign donor involved on the 
Jordanian scene, the United States wields the most potential for placing pressure on the 
regime. The United States could use foreign assistance in conjunction with personal 
political relationships between the Obama administration and the Hashemite family in 
order to push for reform.
198
 Implementation of this kind of foreign policy could involve 
anything from negative aid consequences if that status quo is maintained to an increase in 
aid following certain benchmarks for reform that the regime must meet. Whether or not 
America will place democratic reform over stability and a buffer for Israeli interests 
remains to be seen, but the power that the United States holds over Jordanian politics 
cannot be denied.   
 Jordan has always favored top down reform that has given it its stable reputation 
over the past century. The current problems raised by the Arab Spring cannot be 
explained away and cannot be brushed under the rug with more rent. While “there is 
always the temptation for the regime to wait and to postpone, but the gradual disaffection 
of the monarchy’s core constituency coupled with efforts to unify opposition 
ranks…could portend a new chapter in the Arab uprisings’ unfolding drama.”199 The 
problem remains that by the time the regime realizes it must concede to the demands of 
the population; it may well be too late for reform to occur without a full-scale revolution 
overthrowing the existing government systems. If true reforms are made within the 
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system, and the new parties in power simply reinforce the status quo for their own benefit 
then the rentier system will continue with new leaders. If Jordan were to follow in the 
footsteps of Egypt and elect Islamist leaders then those new parliamentarians could 
simply continue distributing rent and feeding into the corruption that has been prevalent 
in the country since its creation. The international community will no doubt keep 
pumping aid into Jordan in order to ensure that the volatile situation in the Middle East 
does not engulf the entire region.   
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Conclusion: A Hopeless Cause or a Gradual Transition? 
 
Throughout the turmoil of the Arab Spring, Jordan’s rentier system has weathered 
the storm with moderate promises of reform that have prevented protests from 
destabilizing the government. While these small changes have been enough to quell calls 
for regime change, the instability throughout the region has shown that the rentier model 
is both economically and politically unsustainable. The Jordanian government has shown 
that it is only willing to reform as far as its own power and that of the elite is protected. 
Furthermore, even nations that have experienced a revolution, such as Egypt, are still 
grappling with the same restrictive power structure that was the original source of unrest. 
Jordanian leaders must utilize the Arab Spring as an opportunity to implement reforms 
beyond the survival tactics of the past fifty years. While the cycle of rent is difficult to 
break, the regime must realize that this self-reinforcing cycle will only lead to its own 
demise. Through a program of gradual economic liberalization, large scale protests 
should be able to be avoided and a more representative government can act as the true 
voice of the people. Jordan’s test remains to be seen in the reactions of the population to 
liberalization that will inevitably push the elites out of their restrictive circle of power. 
 One of the issues that has continuously plagued Jordan, as well as all other rentier 
economies, is that of a bloated public sector blocking development of private enterprise. 
History has repeatedly shown the failure of the Washington Consensus in Arab states 
because forced liberalization measures have only caused social unrest and forced regimes 
to resort back to rentier subsidy policies. A lesson needs to be learned from the recent 
political upheavals that “private sector development is not simply a matter of improving 
investment climate, reducing the cost of doing business, offering cheap credit, or 
87 
 
introducing market friendly economic reforms. It is also a political problem, since a 
private sector that generates income streams independent of the patronage network of the 
regime can also be viewed as a political threat.”200 Elites have no incentive to promote 
economic changes that will decrease their standing in society, and the masses do not have 
the tools at their disposal to call for true reform. While Jordan’s private sector has 
continued to exhibit problems common in the Arab world, a bloated public sector is not 
sustainable in today’s increasingly globalized world. This chronic problem will continue 
to become relevant only when subsidies decrease and the public reacts, unless a gradual 
liberalization program is implemented. Although Jordan has been able to utilize foreign 
aid to stifle the calls for revolution when food prices have been increased in the past, this 
pattern is completely unsustainable and needs to be dealt with before an economic 
downturn forces change to happen quickly and violently. In tying economic realities to 
political incentives, the rentier state must be gradually abandoned in such a way that does 
not suddenly unseat the elites or push the masses into economic hardship. The political 
conditions of the Arab Spring serve as an appropriate warning to the entrenched regimes 
of the region that the unsustainable cyclical nature of the rentier state cannot continue 
forever. 
 
 
The failed reforms throughout the years have discouraged the public from actively 
participating in government; however their support for reforms is not necessary given the 
balance of power in the rentier system. Elites have been given all of the benefits that 
come with the influx of foreign aid and remittances in Jordan and therefore have been the 
main proponents of maintaining the current system. The question of true liberalization 
has become “a question not just of the nature and attributes of reform, but also of elite 
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incentives.”201 If the East Bankers in Jordan do not support a policy of the government, 
their opinions weigh much more heavily than those of the Palestinians or other 
marginalized groups. Incentives for the elites in the Jordanian system must be both 
political and economic because no privileged group will willingly accept a reduction in 
its current status. In a letter from tribal leaders to King Abdullah II in the wake of the 
Arab Spring, these groups made it clear that their interests were purely in the 
continuation of the rentier system and only aligned with democratic aims when it fit their 
economic needs. Specifically, this letter accused Queen Rania of being responsible for 
some of the rampant corruption within the kingdom.
202
 Only a combination of economic 
and political incentives will be able to create the conditions necessary for effective 
change to occur in the Hashemite Kingdom. 
 Are Monarchies the Exception to the Arab Spring?
 
 
Throughout the past two years of turmoil and regime change in the Middle East, 
the general rule of Arab Spring revolts has been that Arab republics have been subject to 
waves of public opinion much more than Arab monarchies. In general, protests in Jordan, 
Morocco, and Bahrain have failed to reach critical mass whereas Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, 
and Yemen have had their core political structure tested by consistent demonstrations. 
Monarchies have a few distinct advantages over their Arab republican counterparts. 
While many of the authoritarian republicans have ceased to accommodate political 
participation entirely, monarchies “can tolerate a much broader space for legal political 
dissent than can the authoritarian republics precisely because they do not have to pretend 
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that their authority to rule stems from electoral victories.”203 Although the Jordanian 
regime has outlawed any criticism of the king or the royal family, protesters still have the 
ability to assert their wishes for change without threatening the stability of the country. 
The Muslim Brotherhood may not be allowed to fairly run for seats in parliament, but the 
ICP has been allowed to have a façade of power in government as long as the real power 
remains in the hands of the regime elites. While this premise of allowing for some extent 
of dissent under monarchical rule may not be a sustainable system, Jordan has been able 
to escape from the bloodshed and turmoil experienced by Arab republican states. 
 
 
Beyond allowing for a wider span of political opinions, the Hashemite monarchy 
is able to enhance its legitimacy through its ancestral ties to the guardians of the holy 
sites of Mecca and Medina, and, indirectly, to Prophet Muhammad. This is the case with 
most monarchies in the Arab world, and their Muslim populations accept descent from 
the prophet as a foundation of the right of these families to rule. While “popular 
expressions of adoration of the ruler are [often] motivated by self preservation,” the fact 
remains that monarchies are able to garner popular support through their heritage.
204
 
Specifically in the case of Jordan, King Hussein “did enjoy a degree of popular support, 
but King Abdullah and Queen Rania have been the subject of widespread criticism” and 
have had many more questions raised about their legitimacy than had ever been discussed 
prior to Abdullah’s ascent to the throne.205 The past popularity of the late King Hussein 
has shielded King Abdullah from some of the harsher criticisms of his rule, however the 
general sentiment remains that Hussein was much more committed to the reform process 
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than his son. Despite the some calls for regime change in Jordan, the lineage of the 
Hashemite family combined with the popularity of the last king has been able to insulate 
the kingdom from the same type of violent upheavals occurring in republics around the 
Middle East.  
 Protesters in Jordan have often been unsuccessful in achieving their demands for 
change as a result of the inconsistencies of their demands. While calls for economic 
reform have radiated throughout the kingdom, all major groups of protesters have been 
unified in their support for a continuation of King Abdullah’s rule.206 The king’s tactic of 
changing ministers and calling for parliamentary elections during times of unrest has 
been successful in defraying his own accountability for the state of affairs in his own 
nation. This system has allowed for any “conflict [to appear to be] between the King's 
elected government and the opposition” instead of a conflict between the monarchy and 
its people.
207
 Although the king has been able to portray any failings during his rule as 
problems with the government and not with his own goals of reform, the end result has 
continued to be frustration for citizens who elect new parliamentary representatives who 
do not act on behalf of the people. No true structural changes to the rentier system will be 
able to be enacted while the king remains in this position of infallibility.  
Is There a Path Out of the Rentier System? 
 An argument exists that King Abdullah II is truly a democratic reformer at heart, 
however he is a victim to the pitfalls of the rentier system that has been built up over the 
past fifty years. In an interview with Jeffery Goldberg shortly after ascending to the 
throne in 1999, Abdullah stated that “privatization, modernization, and political 
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liberalization were all high on the agenda” for reform within the kingdom.208 His lofty 
goals would have pushed Jordan to liberalize its economy and gradually move away from 
the patronage system that previous leaders had supported. Despite all of the late King 
Hussein’s popularity, he “was not a modern manager, and he bequeathed to his son a 
sclerotic economy and a political system built on wasta, or favoritism, and the 
exploitation of tribal rivalries. Abdullah believed he would fix all that.”209 With all of 
these liberal ideals, Abdullah was seen as a leader who would be able to steer the country 
towards a more representative system that did not rely on support from tribal leaders over 
popular support garnered from a majority Palestinian population.  
 Over the course of his rule, the king has fallen short of many of his initial reform 
initiatives. Abdullah clearly understands “that the Hashemite throne, and perhaps Jordan 
itself, will not survive the coming decades if he does not move his country briskly toward 
modernity,” however concrete actions for modernization and liberalization have yet to 
materialize.
210
 Many members of the Hashemite family have been accused of personally 
perpetuating corruption within the kingdom, including reports that the king himself has 
become addicted to gambling. While the royal court disputes these claims as mere 
rumors, it is significant that those at the top of the system are seen as lacking 
commitment to true reform. Whether or not Abdullah has personally contributed to the 
corruption within the rentier state, he cannot claim to have taken any steps towards 
reforming Jordan’s economy. Actions have spoken louder than words and the king’s 
good intentions have meant little over the course of his rule.  
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 Abdullah’s reform efforts have consistently been thwarted by elements within the 
regime. The king has been repeatedly frustrated with the lack of transparency within the 
mukhabarat, or intelligence services, because of the conservative attitude of the entire 
organization. These agents have, according to Abdullah, inserted themselves in politics in 
order to further the East Bank agenda and enforce the status quo.
211
 Additionally, the East 
Bank tribal leaders have pushed the king into supporting their platform of patronage 
because of their significant electoral sway.
212
 As pro-democracy as the king’s initial 
intentions may have been, he has not been able to push past these entrenched elements of 
the rentier state. If there is to be any hope of reform, Abdullah will need to give up the 
support of these key elements of the regime and accept a more popularly supported 
system that may reduce his own power.  
 Despite his repeated pledges of support for liberalization and modernization, King 
Abdullah has shown himself to be in favor of democracy that has specific restrictions. 
While he has openly supported a democratic system that would give more representation 
to the majority of Palestinians living in Jordan, he has stopped short of agreeing to any 
electoral reforms that would allow the Muslim Brotherhood to gain more support in 
parliament. “In other words, the king wants to bring political reform to Jordan, and to 
cede some of his power to the people- but only to the right people.”213 Rentier politics 
under Abdullah have proved to simply perpetuate the status quo in order to serve the 
interests of rent seeking groups. When more popular representation is allowed, such as in 
the most recent round of electoral reforms, it is carried out in such a way that reform can 
be engineered from the top down in order to maintain the interests of those in power. 
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 King Abdullah has repeatedly been told by Western advisors that he must allow 
the Muslim Brotherhood to have a substantial voice in the government in order to prove 
that he is truly committed to democracy. The king, however, feels that the “Brotherhood 
is run by “wolves in sheep’s clothing” and wants to impose its retrograde vision of 
society and its anti-Western politics on the Muslim Middle East.”214 He believes that the 
Brotherhood intends to support democratic devices as a means to accumulating power 
without an actual desire to utilize any liberal form of government once they have gained 
the necessary support. While the Brotherhood stands out as the primary alternative to the 
rule of the rentier state, their true intentions will not be able to be seen until they have 
been given the political power they claim to deserve.     
 There are two theories behind the secondary role that the Brotherhood has agreed 
to play in the Jordanian government. One states that the group stays out of elections 
because they are certain that the government will fall soon and they do not wish to claim 
any accountability for the actions of a corrupt regime. The other is more sinister and 
asserts that this organization is actively plotting to bring down the government and 
therefore they do not wish to have any of their members involved in the current rentier 
system. “The king, for his part, is certain that the Muslim Brotherhood wants to see him 
gone. The GID has told him that the Brotherhood high command in Cairo is actively 
fomenting unrest in Jordan.”215 His certainty that members of the Brotherhood are simply 
biding their time until they can seize a moment to overthrow him has meant that 
Abdullah will not allow electoral reforms to be passed that will enable the Muslim 
Brotherhood to gain a significant majority in parliament. The true intentions of this group 
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remain unclear, but it is certain that their absence from the system is holding it back from 
becoming a constitutional democracy.        
To What Extent Does the System Control the King? 
 King Abdullah has extolled the benefits of representative government ever since 
ascending to the throne, despite the lack of concrete changes that have been made to the 
rentier system. A possible reason for the absence of reforms is that “perhaps Abdullah is 
so taken with the American system that, if anything, he overstates its virtues. In his 
proselytizing for political reform, he holds up the United States as the Platonic ideal. The 
paralysis and pettiness of Washington does not seem to have made an impression on 
him.”216 Abdullah’s American education has seemed to have instilled a love of 
democracy that has endured throughout his years as king, even if he has not been able to 
implement the reforms he believes will benefit his nation.  
 The question remains to be raised that, if Abdullah believes in liberalization and 
representation, why has he allowed the rentier system to become more and more 
entrenched throughout the course of his rule. While “Abdullah seems to genuinely want 
his people to be richer, happier, and more politically empowered than they are now” he 
has been unwilling or unable to take action to achieve these goals.  A possible 
explanation could be that he is realistic enough to recognize “that only if Jordanians are 
content will they readily agree to the perpetuation of Hashemite rule.”217 He has become 
trapped by the system that he is supposed to lead and although he is the absolute ruler, he 
has encountered many opponents of his agenda, from conservative East Bankers and 
revolutionary Muslim Brothers alike. The king’s intentions have ceased to be significant 
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in a rentier system that has expanded to encompass the entire government and has trapped 
all citizens in the cycles of rent-seeking.  
 The sentiment on the Jordanian street regarding democracy is a significant, if not 
the most significant, factor in determining if democracy can be sustainable. While a 
majority of Jordanians polled in 2012 did express a favorable view of democracy, they 
“have become less likely to hold this view since last year, when 72% said it was better 
than any other type of government.”218 In order for democratic reforms to be successful, 
the population must be willing to push for its own rights. While the majority of 
Jordanians still prefer democracy over other forms of government, if the current negative 
trend of public opinion continues there will soon be little support for a representative 
government. It is clear that there is not much time left for liberal reform in Jordan and 
citizens are beginning to lose faith in democracy as a whole.  
 
Andrew Kohut, ed., Most Muslims Want Democracy (n.p.: Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2012), 14. 
 Beyond internal pressures that prevent the king from making any substantial 
reforms, international actors play a significant role in perpetuating the rentier system. 
President Obama visited Israel, Palestine, and Jordan in March 2013 and he spent much 
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of his time in Jordan discussing the growing Syrian refugee crisis. Upon returning to 
America, President Obama pledged 200 million dollars of additional humanitarian aid to 
the Jordanian government.
219
 It cannot be certain exactly what this money will be spent 
on, but it is clear that the corruption within the Jordanian regime has utilized foreign aid 
for its own benefit in the past. Jordan does truly need this aid to deal with the influx of 
refugees crossing its border from Syria each day. In early April 2013, the number of 
Syrian refugees in Jordan was estimated at more than 400,000, with more fleeing the 
violence each day.
220
 Despite the urgent and dire need of these people for food and 
shelter, it is not clear that all of the aid being sent to Jordan is actually benefitting those in 
need. The rampant corruption in the rentier regime has pushed money away from its 
rightful recipients in the past and remains a significant factor in the impact of the 
international aid flooding into the country.   
Looking to the Future 
 After considering all aspects of the rentier state in Jordan and all of the barriers 
preventing reform, the situation appears relatively hopeless. Reforms have been 
implemented from the top of the system down, and the reforms that are allowed to take 
effect by the government largely serve to reinforce the status quo with the façade of 
change. Domestically, rent seeking groups such as the East Bank tribal leaders have 
continued to resist any political or economic reforms that would negatively impact their 
elite status in society. Internationally, foreign powers such as the United States and the 
Gulf States have continued to pour money into the Jordanian system in the hope of 
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propping up an unsustainable regime. In the wake of the Arab Spring, Jordan cannot 
afford to uphold the rentier system, nor can it successfully turn this system into a more 
representative and open state.  
 King Abdullah has become trapped by his own system, and any reforms that he 
has intended to make have been quelled by actors who have an interest in maintaining the 
channels of rent in the kingdom. Regarding Crown Prince Hussein, “the biggest favor 
[Abdullah] could do for his son now, he says, is to de-emphasize the power of the throne. 
“The monarchy is going to change. When my son becomes of age and becomes king, the 
system will be stabilized and … it will be a Western democracy with a constitutional 
monarchy.” But, he says, “even with all the changes I’m doing here, there is still going to 
be a monarchy.”’221 It appears for the sake of the continuation of the monarchy in Jordan; 
King Abdullah’s approach will continue to be mitigating popular unrest so that he can 
prevent blame from falling on his own family. There is not enough support for 
democracy or economic liberalization within the kingdom or from international actors, 
and the system will continue give benefits to those at the top, and oppress the majority of 
the Jordanian population.  
 While an Islamist revolution could theoretically destroy the system from the 
bottom-up, the transition to a more representative government would not come easily to a 
state that has sustained such an entrenched system since its inception. Any lasting change 
would have to result organically and would have to be supported by the majority of the 
population, a majority that is currently not in favor of any reform that would decrease 
subsidies on basic goods. While the current system will most likely not morph into a 
democracy in the future, hopefully the movement away from the monarchy that Abdullah 
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has suggested will open the system to political newcomers who will be able begin to 
work towards economic, if not political, liberalization. If absolutely no change occurs and 
the system continues to reinforce itself, then political revolution or economic collapse 
could likely be the next development in the Hashemite Kingdom.      
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